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During the past decade or so diverse countries have introduced radical reforms in 
the way their fiscal bureaucracies conduct one of the most pressing national tasks: the 
collection of taxes (Jenkins, 1994; Taliercio, 2000). The reform, an early version of 
which originated in the developing world in Bolivia and Ghana in the late 1980s, has now 
been adopted by more than fifteen countries, including Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
2 More precisely, 
there is a pattern in each of these countries in that the traditional line departments 
(sometimes including customs) are being separated from the ministry of finance (MOF) 
and granted the legal status of semi-autonomous authorities.
3 These semi-autonomous 
revenue authorities (ARAs) are designed with a number of autonomy-enhancing features, 
including self-financing mechanisms, boards of directors with high ranking public and 
private sector representatives, and sui generis personnel systems. 
The success of the first wave of reforms, in which the ARA model, bolstered by 
good tax policy reforms, boosted revenues significantly and improved service delivery, 
has encouraged imitation. The worldwide trend toward semi-autonomous tax authorities 
has picked up speed recently, as more and more countries adopt this organizational 
design. In addition, international financial institutions (IFIs) have proposed on an ad hoc 
basis, though not yet as a matter of formal policy, the adoption of the ARA reform. 
Moreover, the ARA reform has coincided with the vogue of autonomization of 
executive agencies in the OECD and other developed countries. Interestingly, the march 
toward autonomization in the sphere of fiscal administration (not to mention the 
phenomenon of autonomization in the sphere of monetary policy through independent 
central banks) in developing countries began a few years before the launch of executive 
agencies in Europe and the US, though ideas about New Public Management-type reform 
were certainly percolating wide and far by the mid-1980s. 
 
                                                 
1 An earlier and highly condensed version of this work appears in Taliercio (2003a). 
2 In several other countries the reform is under active consideration, including Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines, in which a draft ARA reform bill was introduced to Congress in 2002. 
3 Throughout the paper the generic Ministry of Finance (MOF) is used instead of the actual corresponding 
name in each country.   3
Central Questions: Theory, Performance, and Design 
In spite of the proliferation of ARAs, there has been little comparative analytical 
work on their design, performance, or sustainability.
4 Moreover, there has been no work 
on the practical side of designing and implementing an ARA reform. This paper attempts 
to address these gaps in the literature by examining cases of ARA reform from Africa and 
Latin America. The paper tackles three central questions
5: 
 
•  First, what has motivated the wave of ARA reforms in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America over the past decade? 
The paper argues that from a public management perspective autonomy can be 
used to enhance bureaucratic performance in low capacity public sectors. The argument 
is simply that in certain cases the benefits of autonomy in terms of organizational 
performance outweigh the costs. From a normative view, the challenge is determining 
under what circumstances the net present value of the ARA reform is estimated to be 
positive. In addressing the question of motivation, the paper seeks to reframe the central 
question of the debate, which ought to be “Under what circumstances is autonomy 
appropriate?” rather than “In principle, is autonomy appropriate or not?” 
 
•  Second, is there a connection between autonomy and performance? 
Have ARAs actually improved performance, and, if so, how? Focusing on 
revenue collection, compliance management, taxpayer services, human resource 
management, and administrative costs, and using quantitative indicators when possible, 
the cases suggest that autonomy is associated with higher levels of performance. The 
paper also makes the case that higher levels of autonomy are associated with higher 
levels of performance. 
 
                                                 
4 See Jenkins (1994) and Devas et al. (2001). For an early assessment of the African ARAs see 
Adamolekum and Jah (N.D). On sub-Saharan tax administration reform see Terkper (2003). On South 
Africa see Hlophe and Friedman (2002). On Peru, see Durand and Thorp (1998) and Durand (2002). On 
Tanzania see Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) and Fjeldstad (2002). See also Silvani and Baer (1997) for a 
useful discussion of tax administration reform strategy. 
5 Two additional questions—one on the political motivation for ARA reform, the other on sustainability—
are treated in Taliercio (2004a and 2004b).   4
•  Third, if there is a connection between autonomy and performance, which specific 
design features matter most and why? 
Autonomy comes in many types and forms (see Verhoest (2004) for a taxonomy 
of autonomy in public organizations). In spite of the increasing number of countries 
adopting the ARA reform, there is no consensus on best practice in organizational design. 
The paper will offer hypotheses based on the cases about why certain designs work better 
than others and will make specific recommendations for the next generation of ARA 
reforms. 
 
Methodology and Organization 
The paper analyzes a subset of ARAs from both Africa and Asia. Six cases (the 
Kenya Revenue Authority, KRA; the Mexican Tax Administration Service, SAT; Peru’s 
National Tax Administration Superintendency, SUNAT; the South African Revenue 
Service, SARS; the Uganda Revenue Authority, URA; and Venezuela’s National 
Integrated Tax Administration Service, SENIAT) were selected based on three criteria: 
(1) the importance of the country in the region (measured by GDP in regional 
comparison), which led to the selection of Mexico and South Africa; (2) the longevity of 
the reform experience, which led to the inclusion of Uganda, Peru, Venezuela, and 
Kenya; and (3) the nature of the political context, in which both more (South Africa, 
Venezuela, Kenya, and Uganda) and less (Mexico and Peru in the mid- to late  1990s) 
democratic regimes types were selected. Detailed comparative case studies, based on 
fieldwork carried out in Latin America over an eleven month period in 1998-1999 and in 
Africa over a three week period in July 2001, were prepared for each of the six countries. 
The case studies thus refer to this period in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Section II presents the theoretical arguments for and against ARA reforms in light 
of both political economy and public management considerations. Section III analyzes 
ARA performance. Using broad brushstrokes, the section analyzes several general sets of 
both output and input-based performance indicators: revenue collections, compliance 
management, and taxpayer services on the output side, and human resources and 
administrative costs on the input side. Section IV focuses on practical design issues, 
addressing the following key dimensions of autonomy: legal foundations, corporate   5
governance mechanisms, funding mechanisms, personnel management systems, 
procurement and expenditure management systems, and accountability arrangements. 
The section moves away from legalistic descriptions of organizational designs to analysis 
of how these features work in practice, suggesting measures for strengthening ARA 
design. The paper concludes by offering guidelines for thinking about the conditions 
under which an ARA might be appropriate. 
 
II.  THE RATIONALE FOR AND AGAINST ARA REFORM 
Generally, autonomy, or self-governance, is defined against the traditional tax 
administration (that is, a ministerial line department). The extent and nature of ARA 
autonomy is distinct from the kind of the autonomy assigned to other types of public 
sector organizations (central banks, for example). In practical terms, how does one think 
about the nature and level of revenue authority autonomy implied by the political 
economy and public management literatures?
6 
A useful way to think about autonomy is in terms of the problems it is intended to 
solve. Autonomy is a response to inadequate central government civil service and public 
expenditure management (PEM) systems. Autonomy is also considered an antidote to the 
failure of the political system to build in effective accountability mechanisms that 
channel political influence around and through the public administration in appropriate, 
salutary ways. When the political system fails to do these things, undue political 
influence, which distorts and undermines public service provision, is exerted over public 
administration. Autonomy is then the vehicle by which the intended outcome—
competent, effective, and fair tax administration—is supposed to be attained. 
Viewed through this lens, then, autonomy is intended as a remedy for 
administrative as well as political problems. On the administrative side there are many 
cases in which sclerotic civil service systems impede the development of a competent and 
effective tax administration. Centralized civil services commissions may not recruit the 
professional, specialized employees that tax agencies need. Moreover, civil service 
salaries, which may be quite low by private sector standards, are often  insufficient for 
attracting high caliber professionals. This problem no doubt affects the entire 
                                                 
6 For a political economy argument, see Taliercio (2004a).    6
government, but it is especially acute in the area of tax administration, which requires 
professional accountants and lawyers with skills easily employed in private sector firms 
and consulting practices.
7 In addition, civil service systems are often unable to provide 
the specialized training needed by tax agencies. All of these problems are made worse by 
the slow, red tape-laden processes and procedures of typical developing country civil 
services. So though the problems of a weak civil service affect the whole of government, 
one can make an argument that those problems are felt much more acutely in the tax 
administration as compared to most other public agencies.
8 
An additional problem, which, along with low salaries, might be the most 
pernicious, is characteristic of most African and Latin American cases: the use of the 
civil service for political patronage purposes. In many countries in Africa and Latin 
America civil service systems, to the extent that they exist, are only formally 
meritocratic. They  are governed more by the political (and in some African countries, 
ethnic) calculi of the ruling party than the principles of meritocracy. The patronage 
problem is exacerbated in the area of fiscal administration because tax administration, 
especially customs, is viewed as a prime patronage plum and an important source of 
revenue for political parties. Patronage-based staff appointments lead to the employment 
of individuals with little or no experience in taxation, corruption, and high turnover rates. 
An extreme example is the case of Bolivia, in which it was estimated that three-quarters 
of the staff of the internal revenue agency was replaced after a change of government in 
1997 (it was reported that in one case a barber was given a job as a tax auditor).
9 It is the 
gravity of the patronage problem in Latin America that led some to view the ARA reform 
as necessary in order to establish a merit-based system in the area of tax administration. 
Interestingly, others, especially in Asia, have viewed the ARA reform as necessary for 
bypassing the inadequacies of the existing civil service. Though different countries have 
come at the problem from different angles—politicization or calcification of the existing 
civil service system—the solution is regarded as the same. The promise of autonomy in 
                                                 
7 This problem is compounded by the fact that the opportunity cost of an accountant rises after having 
served a couple of years in the national tax administration, a situation which promotes the practice of using 
employment in the tax agency as a training ground for a subsequent private sector career. 
8 The case for unique treatment of the tax administration is based on its unique function as the provider of 
public resources. Because of that pivotal role, an argument for special treatment has merits. 
9 Taliercio (2000).   7
the area of personnel management is that of an honest, professional, well-paid staff that is 
trained on a continuous basis and responsive to management’s changing staffing needs 
over time. 
Autonomy is also seen as a remedy for weak corporate governance, in both the 
administrative and political senses. On the administrative side the idea is to empower a 
manager to have enough control over personnel, funding, budgeting, and procurement to 
manage the tax agency effectively and efficiently. Note, however, that each of these 
dimensions—personnel, funding, budgeting, and procurement—are characterized by 
separate autonomy-enhancing mechanisms. Even given these separate mechanisms, many 
ARAs also grant a certain amount of autonomy to the tax agency chief (commissioner or 
superintendent). The additional autonomy granted to agency management has to do more 
with the political motivation for reform. 
Tax administration has traditionally been an area characterized by high levels of 
political intervention. Few agencies are as powerful as the tax administration, which 
monitors and appraises the economic activities of most of the state’s citizens and 
corporations. The tax agency also has important financial information pertaining to the 
economic operations of each of these actors; nearly all citizens and firms must report to 
the tax agency at least once a year. The tax administration oversees all sectors of the 
economy, as opposed to regulatory bodies, which are also powerful but whose reach is 
much more limited. Thus having political control over the tax agency can pay high 
dividends. Politicians can intervene in the agency to grant favors such as tax exemptions 
to supporters or to harass political opponents through audits, for example. The persistent 
use of the tax agency for political purposes in some countries has eroded taxpayer 
confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the tax administration in many countries, 
which, in turn, has undermined compliance. An important aspect of the ARA reform is 
thus to give the tax agency’s management autonomy from undue political influence. 
Another central element of the ARA reform is aimed at providing the agency with 
financial autonomy and stability. The inadequacy of PEM systems in many countries—
chronic instability in monthly funding levels and uncertainty about total annual resource 
allocations—all lead to serious management problems, including the distortion of 
expenditure efficiency, higher procurement costs, and persistent underfunding. As a   8
substitute for a sound PEM system, the ARA reform attempts to provide consistent, 
predictable funding via a special mechanism, which in many cases means granting the 
ARA a fixed percentage of collections. In some cases the funds are directly retained by 
the ARA, thus eliminating dependence on treasury intervention. 
It is argued that the percentage-based funding mechanism has two other important 
benefits. First, once politicians set the maximum cost of collections (in percentage terms) 
at their preferred level, they are free to leave budget management to the ARA. Second, 
the mechanism provides incentives to the tax agency to increase collections: as 
collections increase, the authority’s budget increases as well. If the classical assumption 
that bureaucrats are budget maximizers is valid, then one would expect revenue authority 
managers and bureaucrats to have solid incentives to do their best to increase collections, 
thereby increasing their budget (the implications of this mechanism are explored further 
in the next section). Thus, a percentage-based funding mechanism coupled with 
automatic retention of funds would not only insulate the ARA from the pernicious effects 
of a weak PEM system but could also provide hard incentives to increase collections.
10 
Several other features are thought to be important for building autonomy. In order 
to compensate for slow, cumbersome central procurement processes, ARAs in some 
cases are empowered to develop their own procurement systems, thereby enhancing 
managerial effectiveness. Another important autonomy-enhancing feature is the legal 
foundation of the authority, chiefly its legal status and its right to own property. The legal 
status of the ARA has the potential to protect it from shifting political winds. In addition 
authorities that are able to own patrimony have be definition greater flexibility in the 
utilization of resources. Thus, the organizational features outlined above are intended to 
grant some measure of autonomy to the tax agency in order to boost its effectiveness, 
competence, and fairness, and there by its credibility with the taxpayers. 
At the same time a number of arguments have been leveled against the idea of 
ARAs. Some argue against autonomous tax agencies on the grounds of reform strategy. 
Thus the ARA reform is considered a variant of the “enclave” approach to reform, which 
is sometimes disdained for its lack of comprehensiveness. The anti-enclave argument 
                                                 
10 Carlos Silvani has argued that the financing mechanism should be countercyclical to protect tax 
administration during a recession (for example, in a recession the agency might need to hire contract 
workers to maintain collections).   9
posits, perhaps implicitly, that it is better either to reform the government as a whole or 
leave things the way they are. A key assumption in this line of thinking is that partial 
reforms might actually make more comprehensive reforms more difficult at a later date. 
Whether this argument is compelling or not depends on the potential for global 
reform and the goals of the reformers. If a more comprehensive reform of the civil 
service were possible, then this argument might hold some water. If the choice were 
between the ARA reform on one hand and no reform on the other, reformers might prefer 
the former. The anti-enclave argument also loses some of its sway given the uniqueness 
of the tax administration. To the extent that the whole of government relies in no small 
part on the tax administration, one can make a compelling case for exceptional treatment 
under circumstances. 
Others have argued that giving special treatment to a particular organization like a 
tax agency would have negative externalities throughout the rest of the government, 
causing other civil servants to envy and disdain the reformed agency. If this were to 
happen, according to this line of argument, inter-agency cooperation could become 
problematic, perhaps resulting in less effective overall public administration. 
This argument might have some truth to it, but it might also be that the potential 
externalities are overstated. While there is no doubt that better working conditions and 
higher salaries might cause envy in some civil servants, it does not necessarily follow that 
this envy would amount to a significant impact on performance. 
A third counter-argument, which may be the most important, hinges on concerns 
about bureaucracy run amok. Especially given the powerful place of the tax agency in the 
national bureaucratic pantheon, some have been concerned that autonomization would 
reduce accountability and undermine the authority of the MOF. In certain circumstances 
this might be a legitimate concern. 
The counterargument, however, is that accountability mechanisms need to be built 
in from the start to safeguard against administrative malfeasance. It would indeed be 
unwise to establish a revenue authority without any countervailing checks and balances 
on its autonomy. Given proper accountability features, the authority would have a much 
more difficult time running amok. Ultimately, however, this is an empirical question. No 
cases of ARAs running amok have yet been reported.   10
A fifth argument against the ARA reform is that, given its comprehensiveness and 
potential for disruption, it could divert attention from reform of the basic functions of tax 
administration, including registration, collections, and audit. The validity of this 
argument would depend on the capacity of reformers to move ahead on simultaneous 
fronts. It would also depend on the design of the overall reform. Needless to say, 
autonomy is merely the first step: subsequent reforms would have to focus on good 
management, a sound tax administration strategy, and appropriate operational procedures, 
and the entire program would have to be sequenced according to capacity constraints. 
One last argument is sometimes made against the idea of autonomy on the 
grounds that what really matters is professionalization, or good management, not 
autonomy per se. Autonomy and professionalization, however, are not mutually 
exclusive. To establish an autonomous authority and then staff it with unprofessional 
managers defeats the purpose. Appointing good, professional managers, and providing 
incentives for them to sustain their performance over time, are critical conditions to 
ensuring the success of the third party delegation solution.
11 
This section has set out the arguments for and against ARA reform, though ARA 
reform must be judged explicitly against other reform options as well. Implicit in the 
decision to accept or reject the ARA model is a consideration of the net benefits of other 
options. What is the opportunity cost of undertaking the ARA reform and foregoing other 
options? 
The most likely other option is a gradualist approach, which often involves a 
strategy based on a series of modest measures. The gradualist approach is generally 
carried out over the long term. Chile is often cited as the example of this strategy. Chile’s 
tax administration is among the best in the developing world, yet it is not autonomous. 
Chile’s exceptionalism extends, however, far beyond its tax administration. Chile has had 
a tradition of a more professionally-oriented civil service dating from the 19
th century, 
and its tax administration reform program began in earnest in the 1960s. Chile’s reforms 
have been very incremental, leading to slow but steady progress over a thirty-plus year 
period. Even if the Chilean model were replicable, one must ask whether other models 
                                                 
11 Taliercio (2000) provides a chapter on revenue authority tax commissioners (and their management 
strategies) in Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.   11
would produce more rapid results. The point is that the costs and benefits of a gradualist 
approach should also be carefully weighed in context. 
In sum, the issue of autonomy should not be analyzed as if it were a question of 
principle. Whether autonomy is desirable or not should be based on an analysis of the 
expected costs and benefits of autonomy. If autonomy improves performance, then 
autonomy yields positive benefits. If autonomy also creates costs, then the benefits 
should be weighed against the costs. The decision that governments must take on the 
autonomy question should be based on the expected net present value of the ARA reform. 
The purpose of the next section is to shed light on the question of expected benefits and 
costs by assessing the experience of ARAs in six diverse Latin American and African 
countries. 
 
III. DOES AUTONOMY IMPROVE PERFORMANCE? EVIDENCE FROM THE 
CASE STUDIES 
Overall the ARAs examined show a mixed performance record, due, in part, to 
the problems of sustainability associated with many of these cases (see Taliercio, 2003b). 
The best performers across a range of indicators have been Peru, Kenya, and South 
Africa, though others have had more limited success in some areas. The cases suggest 
two preliminary findings. First, performance improved most when autonomy was 
relatively high in comparative terms (Peru, Kenya, and South Africa). The corollary is 
that performance improved least in cases where autonomy was low (Mexico), and 
performance varied, initially improving then leveling off or falling, in cases in which 
autonomy decreased over time (Venezuela and Uganda). Second, when autonomy was 
stable, performance tended to improve, albeit slowly in some cases. 
Thus, there is an observable trend of improved performance in the cases with 
some modicum of sustainable autonomy over time, suggesting that two causal factors 
play a role: the level of autonomy and its stability (with a likely interaction term between 
the two). The cases suggest that stability is necessary but not sufficient, however. Some 
relatively higher level of autonomy is also necessary. Put differently, greater stability can 
help compensate for lower autonomy.   12
At the same time a word of caution is in order. The metaphor of painting a 
picture, rather than presenting a rigorous quantitative analysis that controls for exogenous 
variables, is appropriate here for a number of reasons.
12 First, data availability, especially 
in the pre-reform period, is difficult to obtain. The ideal methodology would have been to 
compare performance indicators pre- and post-reform to ascertain whether there were 
statistically significant differences in performance. This is not possible as much data from 
the pre-reform period (with the exception of revenue collections) is not available. 
The second challenge is that we do not currently have a rigorous methodology for 
evaluating tax administrations. It is difficult to measure with precision the marginal 
impact of tax administration reform on outcomes like revenue and debt collection, as 
many exogenous factors exert causal influence on these and other related outcomes.
13 
From economic growth to the price of oil to changes in the tax code to the effectiveness 
of the judiciary and police forces, tax administration-related outcomes are affected by a 
host of causal factors. A rigorous multivariate analysis of tax administration performance 
would require an enormous database which is presently unavailable (though this area is 
certainly a promising one for further research). Moreover, even if performance improved, 
the counterfactual (of no reform or other types of reform) would have to be taken into 
account. 
The third challenge is that of measuring autonomy itself. Evaluating the amount 
of overall autonomy that an agency has in comparative terms is tricky precisely because 
autonomy is characterized by a number of different dimensions. Some agencies have 
more personnel autonomy than others, but less financial autonomy. Given this, to 
evaluate the overall level of autonomy in comparative terms one would have to assign 
weights to each dimension of autonomy in order to develop an aggregate measure. 
Assigning weights to administrative features is fraught with subjective peril; I would 
argue that such an approach would not add much value. 
The fourth challenge is related to the problem of sustainability. In each of the 
cases examined autonomy has waned, and in a couple of cases waxed, over time. Thus, 
autonomy has been something of a moving target, which further complicates our 
                                                 
12 On challenges assessing tax administration performance in OECD countries, see Olsson and Waltersson 
(N.D.). 
13 For a multivariate analysis of revenue performance, see Serra (2003).   13
understanding of its impact on performance (the problem of sustainability is not 
addressed here; see Taliercio, 2003b). 
Thus, the goal of this section is modest: to show whether or not autonomy 
impacted agency management, and, if it did, to tell a plausible story about how 
autonomy-enhanced management is linked to changes in performance. This microanalytic 
methodology also addresses some of the difficulties raised above by moving beyond 
crude macro indicators like revenue collections and clumsy indices of autonomy. The 
paper contends that case studies that focus both on administrative reforms as well as 
performance outcomes are the best way to shed light on the question of whether 
autonomy matters.  
The section focuses explicitly on how autonomy affected agency management, 
including personnel management and administrative costs. A clear understanding of how 
autonomy shaped human and financial resource management initiatives undertaken by 
the ARA allows for stronger inferences about how autonomy affected organizational 
output and outcome indicators. The section then examines the performance of ARAs in 
terms of revenue collection, compliance management, and taxpayer services, qualifying 
to the extent possible the impact of exogenous factors and counterfactual considerations. 
 
Managing with Autonomy: Evidence from the Cases 
This section examines how managers used their autonomy to improve overall 
agency management, focusing on human and financial resource management. The 
contention is that those ARAs that made the most progress in these areas should also be 
the ones making the greatest improvement in organizational performance. 
 
Human Resource Management 
The major issue addressed by greater autonomy has been human resource 
management, given the severe problems that pre-reform agencies faced in attracting and 
retaining high caliber professional staff. This section argues that behind any gains in 
performance are internal reforms to management and personnel systems, most of which 
would not have been possible without autonomy. Both the KRA and SUNAT used their 
autonomy to make significant advances in the area of personnel management. SARS has   14
used its more limited personnel autonomy creatively, while SENIAT used its autonomy 
to introduce important reforms at the outset, but its commitment to reform declined over 
time. The SAT has made little progress in this important area. 
Peru is the case characterized by the most far-reaching personnel reform. 
Superintendent Manuel Estela and his team believed that the first priority of the new 
agency should be to reform its human resources. The team undertook a radical overhaul 
of the staff, requiring that each employee reapply for his/her job and subjecting each 
applicant to a rigorous selection process (see Box 1). Of the initial 3,051 workers, 2,034 
were separated from the organization, leaving 1,017 (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999: 44). 
During the initial reform period, SUNAT hired 1,309 workers using meritocratic criteria 
(exams and open competitions), bringing the total staff to 2,326 (a net employment 
reduction of 725 compared with the pre-reform staff complement). The costs of the 
retrenchment program, however, were high for SUNAT, which paid out about US$1 
million in severance payments and an additional US$1 million in enhanced pensions, 
resulting in an average cost per retrenched worker of US$1,131 (Haltiwanger and Singh, 
1999: 57).
14 
Box 1. SUNAT’s Radical Human Resource Reform 
 
On May 18
th, 1991, President Fujimori signed an executive decree (based on powers delegated by 
congress) that declared SUNAT in reorganization.
15 First, the decree provided all personnel with ten days 
to present applications for a position in SUNAT as defined by the new organic structure. Those who 
applied would be subject to an evaluation, and only those passing the evaluation would be rehired. Those 
employees who did not pass the evaluation would still receive their pensions, however. Employees also had 
the option to join the Program of Voluntary Retirement, in which they would receive pecuniary 
compensation but would not be able to work in the public sector for ten years (the decree provided a clause 
for the dismissal of anyone who rehired one of the disqualified workers). Lastly, the decree empowered the 
superintendent to investigate “indicators of immoral conduct” of bureau employees, also giving the 
superintendent the power to remove employees whose “exterior signs of wealth” did not correspond to their 
tax declarations. 
Subsequent resolutions, issued by Estela, defined the “positions of confidence” in and the 
organizational structure of SUNAT.
16 The positions to be filled by the superintendent were defined as the 
adjunct superintendent, the secretary general, the national and regional intendents, and the managers of the 
national and regional intendencies (about 50 positions in total). On June 20
th, Estela’s team issued a 
resolution which detailed the name and number of each type of position within the organization, thus 
                                                 
14 In contrast, Peru’s civil service reform (1991-1993) cost the government on average US$4,735 per 
worker and only relied on voluntary retrenchment mechanisms. SUNAT’s reform was not only involuntary 
but also much less lucrative for the separated workers. Furthermore, not one separated worker was rehired 
by SUNAT, whereas of the 263,654 separated in the civil service, 163,059 were rehired (Haltiwanger and 
Singh, 55).  
15 Decreto Legislativo No. 639, 5/18/91. 
16 Resolutions No. 269-91-EF/SUNAT (5/28/91) and No. 277-91-EF/SUNAT (6/13/91).   15
establishing an establishment register.
17 The same day Estela also issued a resolution on the voluntary 
retirement program, in which pecuniary rewards would be based on accumulated points as a function of 
occupational category and length of service. Those employees eligible to receive pensions would receive an 
additional bonus of 20% in exchange for surrendering the right to receive their pension. 
The SUNAT reform team also believed it necessary to remove SUNAT from the public sector 
employment regime. In September 1991, responding to SUNAT’s petition, President Fujimori issued a 
decree creating a new labor regime.
18 The new regime permitted SUNAT to set the salaries of its 
employees based on their experience and the salaries of comparable jobs in the private sector. Employees 
also had the option, however, to remain in the public sector regime, which enabled SUNAT to argue that it 
was respecting workers’ “rights.” Moreover, the decree established a trial period of three months for all 
new employees (beginning after the six month training period). The decree also provided for dismissal of 
any employee for “lack of probity” or “abuse of authority.” 
 
Salaries, due to the new personnel scheme, increased dramatically. Whereas on 
average a tax administration employee earned approximately US$50 per month in early 
1991, the average salary for the remaining workers increased roughly twenty times to 
US$1,000 (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999: 44). The new salary scale ranged from US$400 
to US$2,000 (The Peru Report, October 1991, 5).
19 There is no question that SUNAT’s 
radical personnel reforms—characterized by retrenchment of two-thirds of the staff and 
huge increases in salaries—would not have been possible without autonomy, and that the 
personnel reforms were among the most important for the success of the overall reform. 
In Venezuela, on the other hand, it was decided that there would be no 
involuntary separations. As a result of the voluntary departure and retirement programs, 
which allowed retirees to collect more than three times the amount that normally would 
have corresponded to them, about 850 employees left the tax agency (the plan made 
retirement conditions more flexible, thus expanding eligibility). An additional 350 
employees, who were transferred automatically to SENIAT but did not meet the 
minimum requirements for employment according to new personnel regulations, retired. 
The voluntary downsizing represented 25.5% of the total staff. 
Though the political establishment would not permit Superintendent José Moreno 
León to undertake radical human resource reform, it did permit him to appoint the entire 
managerial level of the organization. Thus Moreno León was able to hire nearly 500 new 
professionals from top private sector accounting and law firms, which resulted in a vast 
improvement of the managerial ability of the organization. Moreno’s plan was to 
                                                 
17 Resolution No. 280-91-EF/SUNAT (6/20/91). 
18 Decreto Legislativo No. 673, 9/23/91. 
19 The personnel reform cost SUNAT US$47 million in present value terms (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999: 
44), roughly US$20,200 per worker on average.   16
introduce the professional civil service gradually, while eliminating the worst cases of 
corruption with his new personnel statute. 
In Mexico the SAT’s Fiscal Career Service (SFC), intended to be a merit-based 
system, did not quite get off the ground during the initial reform period. Due to union 
opposition, entry into the SFC was made optional for existing employees and mandatory 
only for new employees. In addition, the SFC was to cover only a certain percentage 
(unspecified) of employees; that is, there would still be a category of “freely designated” 
employees, who would not have to fulfill any SFC requirements. This category not only 
included high level managers, but also specialists and technical professionals. 
Survey data on the reforms in Latin America are consistent with the above 
evaluation of the extent of personnel reform. Indeed, the differences are highly 
pronounced. Perceptions of SUNAT’s and SENIAT’s human resources are much more 
favorable than those of the SAT’s. Eighty five percent of Peruvian respondents said that 
tax agency employees are Frequently,  Mostly, or Almost Always more qualified 
professionally than other public sector employees, as compared with 75% in Venezuela, 
and 52% in Mexico. In terms of the impact of the reform, 81% in Peru and 61% in 
Venezuela said tax agency employees were Substantially or Much More Qualified now 
than before the reform, as opposed to 16% in Mexico.
20 
The African cases also show a mixed record in personnel management, from 
Kenya, where the reforms were consistently moving in the right direction, to Uganda, 
which showed forward as well as backward movement. The advent of the KRA is widely 
regarded to have increased the professionalism of the tax agency’s staff and reduced, 
though not eliminated, the level of corruption. KRA improved staff quality through a 
number of measures. The KRA increased salaries in real terms, which was a break from 
the previous salary policy, and actually reduced the total number of staff by over 30% 
over a five year period, with the major change coming from the retrenchment program of 
2000. These reforms would not have been possible without autonomy. 
The KRA instituted a merit-based promotion system and established a personnel 
regime in which staff can actually be dismissed fairly easily by KRA management. 
Managers are empowered with “day to day autonomy” that allows them to fend off 
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pressures to engage in patronage. KRA’s code of conduct and the board disciplinary 
committee have also played important roles in improving the professionalism of the staff. 
KRA’s training programs are more relevant now because they are tailor-made by KRA 
officials themselves, instead of the public service commission. 
The KRA has also made gains in administrative efficiency. Since the founding of 
the KRA, the size of the staff complement has declined year after year. The complement 
inherited by the KRA of approximately 4,500 in June 1995 shrunk to 4,002 in June 2000. 
The net decrease of nearly 500 employees occurred through a combination of attrition 
and disciplinary measures, even though new staff were also recruited during this period. 
A further 830 staff were retrenched in December 2000, leaving approximately 3,140 in 
2001.
21 Though the majority were retrenched for poor performance, about 40% left 
voluntarily. 
Using the salary scales of the central bank and Kenya Commercial Bank as 
references, management established a new KRA salary scale.
22 Funding constraints, 
however, prevented wholesale adoption of the new scale. Moreover, there was a sense 
that applying the new competitive salary scale across the board and in the absence of a 
retrenchment exercise would have been inefficient. Consequently, the scale was applied 
only to top management. The remaining 98% of staff were given several annual across 
the board raises over the KRA period, but their salary position has not improved nearly as 
much as that of top management.
23 Indeed, in 1996 KRA increased its total wage bill by 
49.1% in real terms. 
In the case of South Africa, SARS was granted some autonomy over personnel 
management and has used its autonomy, subject to approval by the MOF, over the past 
several years to modernize its personnel system. Though SARS inherited the civil service 
system in 1997, it introduced its own personnel system in January 1999. As a result of the 
                                                 
21 According to KRA management, the retrenchment plan was discussed since KRA’s inception. 
Opposition from the government and inadequate funding from the treasury resulted in the plan being 
postponed for several years. Of these retrenched, over 550 were support staff. The program was estimated 
to cost approximately Ksh. 360 million. It is worth noting that KRA’s retrenchment package was more 
attractive than the one offered by the government. 
22 The KRA scale subsequently became a model for the greater public sector and was used by KACA, 
which is also characterized by greater autonomy. 
23 The data do indicate, however, that the KRA was serious about increasing wages within its budget 
constraint. The average annual real wage bill increase for the period 1996-2000 was 12.8%, as compared 
with –16.7% in the pre-KRA period (1991-1995). The difference is statistically significant at the 95% level.   18
collective bargaining process, all previous inland revenue and customs and excise staff 
were automatically transferred to SARS. The fifty staff levels of the old system were 
reduced to thirteen and a system of competitive, market-referenced salaries was 
established. SARS staff do earn more than their civil service counterparts, though after 
the recent civil service wage increase the difference is not that great. The limitations on 
SARS autonomy, reinforced by political concerns, appear to have limited the extent to 
which SARS can pay more than the public sector at large. 
The central problem with SARS current compensation system is retention of its 
highly skilled employees, particularly auditors and tax lawyers, who have experienced a 
high rate of turnover due to “poaching” by the private sector.
24 The problem of poaching 
is particularly acute in SARS LTO, which has experienced almost 100% turnover in its 
audit staff in approximately three years. This has occurred in spite of SARS’s overall 
turnover rate of 6%, which is quite low compared to the national (public and private 
sector) average of 13%. Some managers are concerned, however, that SARS audit 
department is treated as a training ground by the private sector. 
SARS has used its autonomy to respond pro-actively: it implemented an 
experimental provision by which supplementary premiums (10% in 2001) can be paid to 
employees with scarce skills. Furthermore, it is using experimental performance contracts 
by which an additional 20% can be made available (this was piloted with the auditors in 
the SARS LTO). Thus, experienced auditors in the LTO could receive a premium of up 
to 30% of their standard salary. SARS autonomy permits it to respond selectively and 
flexibly to the problem of auditor poaching. 
The SARS personnel system developed an interim performance evaluation 
component which was initially operational only for senior managers, and was scheduled 
to be rolled out to all staff after the pilot phase. Previously, however, SARS had 
implemented a radical performance reward system. Given that SARS had not undergone 
an initial retrenchment, and that its new personnel system was not introduced for two 
years after its founding, SARS management deemed it necessary to take a bold step 
regarding performance rewards in order to jump start the reform. Over a three year period 
from 1996-1999 an average of 46% of annual salaries was paid out to staff as 
                                                 
24 Interviews, SARS general managers, , Pretoria, South Africa.   19
performance bonuses. The total bonus available was calculated as a function of the 
amount by which SARS exceeded its annual revenue targets. The bonus system, which 
was extremely popular with staff, served as a substitute for salary reform. Once the new 
compensation system was introduced, the bonus system was scaled back considerably.  
SARS management has an ambiguous take on the popular yet controversial bonus 
system put in place in the early stages of the reform. On the one hand many SARS 
managers believe that the bonus system was largely responsible for SARS improved 
revenue collection performance. On the other many believe that the lack of 
discrimination inherent in the bonus system was inefficient, rewarding slackers as well as 
high performers. Moreover, given the system’s near exclusive focus on collections, other 
important issues like taxpayer services were somewhat neglected as a result. One view 
from the private sector is that the incentives fomented a “prosecutorial mentality” among 
staff, a perception that would tend to undermine SARS’s credibility by calling its 
commitment to fair, impartial treatment of taxpayers into question.
25 
The size of SARS’s staff has decreased from 11,942 in 1999 to 10,847 in 2001, 
nearly a 10% decrease over the period, demonstrating further efficiency gains as a result 
of autonomy coupled with good management.
26 SARS has also moved forcefully against 
cases of corruption and has dismissed 173 employees for misconduct since 1998, 
representing about 1.5% of the total average staff over the period. There is a perception, 
both in SARS and the business community, that corruption in the tax agency has 
decreased since SARS founding and that taxpayer services have improved over the same 
period. This is due, in part, to the perception that the overall quality of staff has improved 
over the period. 
SARS personnel flexibility enables it to adopt different employment modalities 
depending on its needs. For example, SARS outsourced its IT staff from 82 different 
private companies. Each contractor was hired on a one year renewable contract, and, after 
two years all positions were retendered. The tendering process took place outside of the 
collective bargaining arrangements (the contractors are not unionized). This arrangement 
                                                 
25 Interview, South African Chamber of Business, , 7/23/2001. 
26 This decrease is somewhat offset by the fact that the number of contract employees has increased slightly 
from 337 in 1999 to 509 in 2001, and that SARS hires 272 IT consultants on short term contracts for its 
technical services department.   20
allowed SARS to solve the serious problem faced by its predecessor of attracting and 
retaining qualified personnel in the IT department. 
SARS management regarded its experimentation with personnel reform thus far to 
be quite successful. Moreover, it believed the organization has served as a role model for 
both the public and private sectors. SARS believed, for example, that new dispensations 
for managers in the civil service, as well as other terms and conditions of service, 
reflected SARS practices. In addition, SARS has informally advised other parts of 
government on its wage negotiations. The reform of SARS seems to have had something 
of a positive impact on the wider government. 
Of the African cases the URA has shown the least progress in human resource 
management. When the URA was established in 1991 it launched a program of 
interviews in order to vet the staff of the previous tax departments. As a result of this 
process roughly three-quarters of the URA staff was hired from the MOF; the rest came 
from other parts of government, including a small number from the private sector. All 
management staff were hired on three year renewable contracts, while non-management 
staff were appointed on probation for two years. During 1993 and 1994 staff on probation 
were evaluated and a number (about 7.5% of total staff) were terminated for 
unsatisfactory performance. 
The size of the URA’s staff has grown by nearly 90% since 1992, increasing from 
1,208 to 2,269 in 2001 (though the URA has an approved establishment of 2,553).
27 This 
increase occurred in spite of the 1995 corporate plan.
28 The expansion of URA’s staff has 
been due in part to the expansion of its operations. In addition, however, the expansion is 
due to the low level of capital investment over the past decade. At the same time, 
inadequate management also seems to bear some of the blame. For example, the merger 
of the inland revenue and VAT departments did not result in the reduction of staff, even 
though certain functions were being duplicated. Political interference is also a source of 
problems, according to senior managers (there have been cases in which individuals 
dismissed by management have continued reporting to work). Part of the problem seems 
to be that when salaries are increased in the absence of an airtight merit-based personnel 
                                                 
27 Approximately 51% of the staff establishment is administrative (level 11 and below). 
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system (that is, when government interference is still common), patronage pressures may 
increase. 
Turnover has been considerable, however, when one takes into account the fact 
that a total of 647 employees were dismissed or terminated their employment with the 
agency between 1993 and 2001 (of these 257 were dismissed, mostly on account of 
corruption). The highest turnover rates have occurred in the IT, accounting, and auditing 
areas, in which URA is paying considerably less than market rates. 
In 1991 the fledgling URA increased salaries in order to attract private sector 
professionals and to motivate their ex-civil servants to improve job performance. 
Compared with the existing civil service salary structure, remuneration increased several-
fold. The initial increase in salaries, however, has not kept place with inflation. Between 
1991 and 2001 only one further salary increase took place. In 1998 the URA sought 
approval from the MOF for a revision of its salary scales. The MOF approved, but 
declined to provide any additional funding. As a result remuneration (salaries plus 
benefits) for high-level technicians has declined by approximately one-third since the mid 
1990s.
29 
Autonomy has also mattered in another important way in the case of URA: 
expatriates can be hired easily as staff, unlike in the public service. This is not a trivial 
point, as expatriates have come to play an important role in the development of the URA 
(the current CG is a European expatriate), serving as a substitute for an institutional 
bulwark against patronage pressures. 
The Peruvian, Kenyan, and South African cases show the greatest commitment to 
human resource reform. The case of SUNAT is clearly the most far-reaching. SUNAT 
instituted a radical retrenchment program, increased salaries dramatically, and established 
a well-regarded in-house training institute. In Kenya there was a quasi-voluntary 
retrenchment, carried out in the context of declining staff numbers, and a selective 
increase in salaries. The KRA also provides training programs (out-sourced) for its staff. 
Survey and anecdotal information indicates that corruption decreased in both SUNAT 
and KRA as a result of the reforms. SARS did not undertake a retrenchment program, 
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though it has reduced staff numbers slightly. Salaries were increased, though not 
dramatically. The controversial performance bonus tied to collections has been phased 
out, and it remains to be seen whether the salary scale will suffice to attract and keep 
talented labor. SARS has also been flexible in using special initiatives to deal with 
specific personnel problems, and provides excellent training opportunities for its staff. 
The Venezuelan, Mexican, and Ugandan cases show less progress in this 
important area. SENIAT introduced a voluntary retrenchment program, which reduced 
staff numbers initially, and hired top private sector accountants and lawyers to manage 
the reform. The SAT’s experience with personnel reform was lackluster, and Mexico 
continued to have the lowest ratio of taxpayers to tax officials of the countries 
considered. The URA did not initially downsize the organization, and, in fact, increased 
the staff complement over time, though it did sporadically increase salaries. Increasing 
salaries without undertaking some kind of retrenchment program might actually have 
adverse effects.  
 
Financial Resource Management 
The cases show that these gains in performance have not come at great financial 
cost. As Table 1 shows, all ARAs, with the exception of Uganda, had reasonably low 
collection costs (taking 2% as the benchmark). Moreover, the more autonomous ARAs 
tend to have lower average collection costs (recurrent costs expressed as a share of 
collections) than the less autonomous ones. Kenya, Peru, and South Africa are all at the 
low end of the set. At the same time ARA collection costs (as an average of these cases) 
are comparable to or less than those of non-autonomous developing country tax agencies. 
TABLE 1:  AVERAGE COLLECTION COST AS A PERCENTAGE OF REVENUES COLLECTED 
COUNTRY A VERAGE COLLECTION COST 
Peru 1.9%  (1996-1998) 
Mexico  1.7% (1995, 1997-1998) 
Venezuela 2.0%  (1995-1998) 
Kenya 1.2%  (1995-2000) 
South Africa  1.1% (1998-2001) 
Uganda 3.6%  (1991-2001) 
Average 1.9% 
  Source: Author’s calculations from ARA and MOF data, and Taliercio (2000).   23
SARS collection costs have consistently been the lowest of the cases examined, 
ranging from 0.90% to 1.16% of revenues collected (the average over the period 1998-
2001 was 1.00%).
30 SARS’s low cost level put it on par with a number of OECD 
countries in terms of cost to collections efficiency, though the cost ratio has risen 
consistently since 1998, reflecting increased allocations. 
In spite of the reforms, and the increasing budgets that went along with them in 
some cases, one could argue that most of the ARAs remain underfunded. The URA, for 
example, lacked equipment and infrastructure, including an IT system, due to an 
underfunded capital budget (in some years the URA’s capital budget was nearly zero). 
The lack of a proper IT system alone seriously undermined the URA’s performance, from 
registration to assessment to compliance. 
The KRA also reported inadequate resources for IT investment and for rolling out 
the higher KRA salary structure to the entire staff. The KRA operated on a tight budget in 
comparative perspective. The government, however, provided a modern office building 
to KRA (Times Tower), which ought to have had the effect of improving the agency’s 
professional image. Given its very low collection costs, the record of the KRA appeared 
even more impressive in comparison. 
Though SARS has had an increase in investments since 1997, and some of these 
were quite significant, especially in the IT area, its capital budget was somewhat low. 
The percentage of SARS capital expenditures to its total budget, which was in line with 
the other cases, stood low at approximately seven percent (personnel expenditures 
account for roughly half of the SARS budget).
31 The LTO, for example, reported a lack 
of basic infrastructure and key items such as laptop computers. 
Thus the cases show that these reforms have not generated high recurrent cost 
obligations in comparative terms. In the best cases increases in salaries were offset by 
staff reductions. The case studies do suggest, however, that capital expenditure is limited 
to the point of creating inefficiencies for several of the agencies. The cases also show that 
the start up costs of the reform—including for retrenchment and purchase of new 
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average collection costs ratio rises to 1.10% over the same period and does not show a steady increase. 
31 These figures do not include special capital investment projects, financed separately by the MOF, in the 
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buildings—can indeed be high, suggesting the need for special one-off funding of initial 
investment costs. 
 
Organizational Culture, Flexibility, and Corruption 
An important intangible consequence of reform is the impact of autonomy on 
organizational culture. Managers and observers report that in several cases, notably Peru 
and Kenya, autonomy had a significant impact on organizational culture. In the case of 
Kenya, autonomy is reported to have created a corporate identity where one had not 
previously existed. In Peru SUNAT is said to have generated a mística, or organizational 
mystique, that motivated staff to maintain professional standards and improved their 
incentives for good performance. 
Innovative management practices have had far-reaching impacts in a number of 
the cases examined. In Kenya, for instance, the KRA improved its procurement process 
by developing its own regulations, which led to a decrease in the number of “fake 
tenders” and served as a model for the central government, which used the KRA 
regulations to reform its own procurement practices. 
In Kenya the KRA’s board promoted good relations with the private sector by 
encouraging the KRA to take a fair-minded approach toward dealing with taxpayers and 
their representatives. KRA management made it a point of meeting with professional 
organizations to discuss issues and problems of common concern. Many saw the board as 
having “narrowed by gap between the tax administration and the taxpaying public” by 
promoting greater openness and transparency. At the same time private sector 
representatives on the board provided KRA management with useful information on 
which problems taxpayers saw as most vexing.
32 
In the South African case the benefits of additional autonomy to managers were 
clearly apparent. Pre-SARS the tax administration was procedure- and control-driven. 
Managers reported being able to implement organizational change much more quickly 
and effectively than before reform. The case of the large taxpayers office (LTO) is 
illustrative. Before SARS was established, the commissioner of inland revenue 
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attempted, unsuccessfully, to set up an LTO. The former commissioner reports going 
through a series of frustrating experiences, from first seeking special funding from the 
MOF, to purchasing an appropriate building, which took about one year, to getting 
permission to hire high caliber accountants for the unit, and then contracting them, which 
took about two years, to having the funding revoked because too much time had passed, 
to seeing the endeavor fail because high caliber accountants could not be contracted with 
low public service salaries.
33 Though there is room for improvement in the SARS LTO, 
establishing and supporting the unit has been much easier given the agency’s autonomy. 
SARS management also used its autonomy to support organizational 
accountability by establishing an internal audit division in 2000. SARS also reduced 
corruption in its tendering process by managing it more closely, according to the AG. 
Still, SARS managers acknowledged the need for further reform in the procurement 
regulations to reduce the timeframe for contracting and increase flexibility (SARS’s 
tender board functions according to public sector statutes). 
SARS’ autonomy also allowed the agency to be more proactive and flexible. For 
example, SARS created regional offices to decentralize power to managers closer to 
taxpayers. SARS also had the flexibility to undertake special projects as necessary, 
including prosecution and revenue initiatives with special incentives for staff. 
SARS consciously cultivated a corporate image of probity, fairness, and 
effectiveness, in part by crafting a public relations strategy through an active public 
relations department. SARS has attempted to change its organizational culture to one 
focused on performance and integrity, and has succeeded in doing so. SARS also 
cultivated its image by going after criminal convictions for tax evaders as “quick wins.” 
According to the commissioner, SARS needed a “bite in its bark.”
34 There is no doubt 
that SARS’ autonomy allowed managers to innovate more quickly than would have been 
the case without autonomy. According to a representative of the SAICA, “Our concern is 
that the tax administration is running ahead of us and it’s now going to be us chasing to 
catch up with Revenue, and that’s putting stress on our members.”
35 
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Survey data also reveal that taxpayers’ perceptions of corruption vary, as a result 
of the reforms.
36 Indeed, the differences are striking. In Peru 73% of respondents 
classified the agency’s corruption level as Fairly or Very Low, as opposed to 20% for 
Mexico and 6% for Venezuela. In contrast, 29% in Venezuela classify corruption as 
Fairly or Very High, as compared with 17% for Mexico and 2% for Peru. 
In terms of the impact of the reform on corruption, Peru again surpassed the 
others, with 85% responding that there was Substantially or Much Less corruption than 
before the reform, as compared with only 26% in Venezuela and 21% in Mexico. The 
relatively smaller impact in Venezuela reflects the perception of backsliding since the 
reform, whereas the value for Mexico reflected the perception of the of reforms’ minor 
impacts. 
Of the African cases, Kenya and South Africa have gone farther than Uganda. 
Uganda, however, was not without some progress in this area. It is thought that the URA 
reform has reduced the amount of corruption in the tax agency, as compared with the pre-
reform agency, and has reduced the impunity of the corrupt officials that remain. The 
combined effect of higher salaries and stiffer penalties for malfeasance vis-à-vis public 
service employment conditions seems to have made an impact. The URA reform is 
reported to have led to less moonlighting. The URA recently established an on-line 
recruitment system, in which specific posts are advertised against the establishment 
register and application processing is handled electronically. 
Very encouraging is the perception in Kenya, held by both KRA officials and 
private sector tax experts, that corruption has decreased since the reform. According to 
one professional tax accountant, “I’m less likely to get asked for a bribe than in the old 
days.”
37 However, as would be expected, significant corruption still exists, especially in 
customs. According to a previous Commissioner General (CG), “elaborate schemes of 
fraud exist.”
38 Yet in order to reduce corruption further, additional resources and perhaps 
additional autonomy, will be required. 
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Performance in Practice: Evidence from the Cases
39 
  This section analyzes the performance of the ARAs in three broad categories of 
indicators: revenue collection, compliance management, and taxpayer services. The focus 
on compliance and taxpayer services is important to round out the picture provided by 
looking at collection indicators, since collections are only partially determined by tax 
agencies. 
 
Revenue Collection and Efficiency 
Most ARAs have been successful in the most basic of their tasks: raising 
revenues.
40 SUNAT increased total tax revenues
41 from 8.4% of GDP in 1991 to 12.3% 
in 1998, during which time tax policy reforms included the rationalization of the tax 
structure and the reduction of many tax rates (more recent data show collections falling to 
about 11% and then recovering to nearly 12% in 2003).
42 SENIAT increased total 
revenues from 5.9% of GDP in 1994 to 8.5% in 1998, though the increase was due in part 
to the introduction of a new sales tax. SUNAT and SENIAT also increased their revenues 
in real terms over the 1990s. Mexico’s SAT, which benefited from the least autonomy, 
increased revenues only marginally from 1996-1997 (see Figure 2). 
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(2000). 
41 All data for the Latin American cases exclude customs revenues, unless otherwise noted. All data for the 
African cases include customs revenues, unless otherwise noted. 
42 For a more recent analysis, see Mann (2004).    28
















The URA had one of the most spectacular increases in revenues as a percentage of 
GDP: from 7.0% in 1991 to 11.9% in 1999. Over the course of the 1990s, however, tax 
policy changes, including the introduction of the VAT (and the subsequent increase in 
VAT coverage) and the reduction in the number of exemptions, also played a role in 
boosting revenues. 
In Kenya total revenues declined from 27% of GDP in 1994 to 21% in 2000, 
though the decrease was due largely to major tax policy reforms, including the significant 
reduction of tax rates across the board (the reduction of the top marginal income tax rate 
from 40% to 30%, the top import tariff rate from 45% to 25%, and the standard VAT rate 
from 18% in 1995 to 15% in 2000). The accomplishment of the KRA was to maintain 
revenues by increasing administrative efficiency in the context of drastically reduced tax 
rates. Consequently, the KRA exceeded its revenue targets in three years over the five 
year period (1996-2000) after its establishment. Indeed, though the VAT rate standard 
rate was 15% in both years, the ratio of total VAT collections to GDP increased from 
5.0% to 5.4% from 1997 to 2000. 
In South Africa the share of tax revenues to GDP decreased slightly from 24.8% 
to 24.2% over the period 1995-2001, owing largely to changes in tax policies, the net   29
effect of which was to reduce revenue collections to GDP consistent with the MTEF.
43 
SARS, like the KRA, was successful in supporting collections in the face of declining tax 
rates and other revenue-negative policy changes. What the data show is that the 
introduction of ARAs is associated in most cases with either significant increases in 
revenue collections or maintenance of collections in the face of significant tax policy 
change. 
In order to increase the ratio of revenue collections to GDP, ARAs had to post 
impressive grow rates in collections. SUNAT's collections grew by an average of nearly 
11.5% in real terms in the first years after the reform (1992-1995), while SENIAT’s total 
revenues increased by 5% (1996-1997) in real terms annually. The URA’s annual 
average growth rate ran to more than 24% in nominal terms (1995-1997). At the same 
time, in the cases of Peru and Uganda, growth rates tended to fall as the impact of the 
initial policy reforms wore off and collections became more determined by administrative 
practice than tax policy. In the Kenyan case revenues declined in real terms by only 6.7% 
from 1995 to 2000 in spite of decreases in tax rates for all major taxes, reflecting, in part, 
the improved administrative efficiency of the KRA. In South Africa the SARS also 
helped increase revenues by over 99% from 1995 to 2001 in nominal terms, and over 
32% in real terms. The average real annual growth in revenues over the period was 5.7%. 
An analysis of VAT productivity (that is, the ratio of GDP generated by the VAT 
to the VAT rate) shows that Peru is the most productive (0.32), followed by Mexico 
(0.26), Uganda (.25), and Kenya (.19).
44 Though the KRA ranks lower in comparison to 
other revenue authorities, it showed a very slight improvement in VAT productivity over 
the period (pre-KRA average VAT productivity was 0.18 while the post-KRA average 
increased slightly to 0.19). Perhaps more importantly, VAT productivity post-KRA 
shows less deviation than before the reform, when year on year productivity was erratic. 
Even this indicator, however, does not unambiguously rate administrative performance.
45 
Interpretation of the Mexican case is also complicated by the fact that the Mexican VAT 
has the most highly eroded tax base of the Latin American cases examined. 
                                                 
43  For example, tax policy changes proposed in the 2001 budget were estimated to have a fiscal cost of 
approximately 4% of projected revenues. 
44 Calculations exclude VAT collected on imports for comparability (as some ARAs incorporate customs 
and some do not) and to focus on internal tax administration. 
45 Using GDP is also less accurate than using consumption data (taxable consumption is the best measure).   30
TABLE 2. VAT PRODUCTIVITY a/ 
Country Productivity  Rate
Peru (1994-1998) 0.32 
México (1990-1997) 0.26 
Uganda (2000) 0.25 
KRA (1996-2000) 0.19 
         Source: Author’s calculations. 
                a/ Calculated net of VAT collections on imports. 
 
The cases show impressive increases in tax effort in Peru and Uganda, coinciding 
with the introduction of the revenue authorities there, and some progress in Venezuela 
and South Africa, which also coincides with the ARA reforms. They also show that tax 
effort declined in Kenya, though the data would suggest that this occurred primarily as a 
result of tax policy changes. In Mexico collections stagnated and then declined; the data 
suggest that tax administration rather than tax policy were to blame. Though revenue 
collections is a very crude indicator of administrative performance, owing to the large 
number of exogenous factors influencing collections, the cases show that the ARA 
reforms are associated with significant improvements in revenues in some cases. 
 
Taxpayer Registration and Compliance Management 
The foundation of compliance is the ability of the tax agency to keep a current 
registry of taxpayers to ensure that they are submitting their tax declarations and making 
their tax payments according to schedule. Equally important is the ability of the agency to 
broaden the tax base to cover all the taxpayers who legally ought to be paying taxes. The 
cases show that Peru and South Africa have done well here, and that Kenya has made 
some strides in the area of taxpayer registration. The other cases demonstrate less 
progress. 
Peru was one of the most successful in broadening the tax net, as the number of 
active registered taxpayers increased from 895,000 in 1993 to 1,766,000 in 1999. At the 
same time, the quality of information taxpayer registries is often a major problem. Peru, 
however, continually cleaned its registry, and, from 1995 to 1998 purged the registry of 
about 15% of inactive taxpayers per year. SUNAT has been able to increase in absolute 
terms the number of taxpayers filing declarations every year since the creation of the   31
taxpayer registry in 1993, which is indeed impressive. At the same time only 35% of 
taxpayers have filed on average over the period, and SUNAT has not been able to 
increase the relative amount filing (as a percentage of those registered).  
A more detailed analysis shows that SUNAT has been using its limited resources 
judiciously. Data from 1997 show that SUNAT has focused its efforts on large and 
medium taxpayers, and has been extremely successful in the process. The 33,300 large 
and medium taxpayers are well-controlled by SUNAT: the ratios of those declaring and 
paying are 100%. The same ratios for the general and other simplified regimes, however, 
were quite low. 
The data available for Venezuela allow for a limited comparison, revealing that 
SENIAT’s control over its large taxpayers was weaker when compared with SUNAT’s.  
The absolute number of non-filers in SENIAT’s large taxpayers unit increased steadily 
since 1995, nearly tripling by 1998. The average percentage of non-filers to the number 
of large taxpayers registered was 32% over the period, suggesting a large hole in the 
administration’s effort to increase compliance. 
Another useful indicator of administrative performance is late payments by 
taxpayers (total late payments by taxpayers during the year). Data also showed that the 
number of large taxpayers in Venezuela making late payments increased since 1995, 
more than tripling by 1998, though the amount of taxes paid late as a percentage of total 
collections was quite small (about 1%). 
In South Africa SARS steadily broadened the tax net with impressive year on year 
growth. From March 1996 to March 2001 the number of taxpayers with active status 
grew from 518,649 to 976,720 for corporate income taxpayers; 1,929,274 to 3,187,072 
for individual income taxpayers; 388,454 to 450,630 for VAT taxpayers; and 188,841 to 
211,425 for PAYE taxpayers. From 2000-2001 the percentage of active individual 
taxpayers grew by 13.9% while the growth of active corporate taxpayers reached 16.3%. 
Note that the growth of corporate taxpayers was due principally to compliance activities 
by SARS as company registrations did not grow much over the same period.
46 
                                                 
46 Some component of the slow growth in the VAT registry is due to change in the threshold for 
registration.   32
An analysis of the returns outstanding as a percentage of the population of active 
registered taxpayers showed that SARS has made progress in some areas, notably income 
tax, but not in others, notably pay as you earn (PAYE). SARS also continued its efforts to 
increase filing compliance though an on-going clean up of the taxpayer registry. One of 
the difficulties faced by SARS was that there was no single taxpayer identification 
number (TIN). SARS initiated changes to improve taxpayer registration, including the 
establishment of an electronic link with the Registrar of Companies in 2000, such that 
firms registering with the Registrar were automatically registered with SARS. 
SARS, like many other tax administrations, was less successful reducing the 
amount of taxpayers’ arrears. In fact, arrears grew over the SARS period, from 4.01 
billion Rand in March 1996 to 13.24 billion in March 2001 for income tax, 2.70 billion to 
11.86 for VAT, and 0.14 to 4.38 billion for PAYE. Moreover, more than two thirds 
(68%) of the arrears were over nine months of age. 
SARS also made some progress with the establishment of a large taxpayers office 
(Corporate Tax Center, CTC), though the results were not wholly satisfactory. Overall 
implementation of the CTC reform was disappointing, in part because of SARS’ inability 
to attract and retain high quality staff. 
The registration picture was clouded in Kenya due to a botched PIN 
implementation, and poor follow through thereafter, in the pre-KRA period. Over-
registration led to a low proportion of active taxpayers as a percentage of the total 
number registered. The problem was that it was difficult for the KRA to ascertain 
whether firms that did not file or pay taxes were legally or illegally inactive. 
The KRA, however, was quite successful in increasing the number of VAT 
taxpayers in its registry, which grew from 17,106 to 26,591, an increase of more than 
55% from 1997 to 2000. Yet, the KRA faced problems enforcing filing compliance 
among VAT taxpayers. The percentage of non-filers stood at 29% at the end of 2000. The 
major problem confronting the KRA in the area of registration and filing was the lack of 
integration of its databases, which required that staff carry out important work manually. 
Management also failed to integrate the registration function, as separate identification 
numbers were required for different taxes (VAT and income) and separate offices were 
charged with the registration function (management argued that a new IT system was   33
necessary to integrate the VAT and income tax databases, though that budgetary 
limitations prohibit the necessary investments). 
KRA’s Large Taxpayer Office (LTO), established in 1998, was able to streamline 
and improve service quality. The establishment of the LTO was facilitated by the 
agency’s autonomy, which allowed the CG to make and implement the decision. The 
KRA pursued a policy of posting its best staff to the LTO, which, as a result, improved 
monitoring of taxpayer compliance. For example, on-time quarterly payment compliance 
improved from about 85% in 1998 to about 99% in 1999. 
Two additional objectives on which KRA focused are issuing refunds in a timely 
manner and collecting tax arrears. KRA’s management of VAT refund claims improved 
considerably since 1997, most notably in the reduction of the refund backlog from 
approximately 6.2 billion Kshs in 1997 to about 400 million Kshs in 2001. Moreover, 
refund claim values represent a backlog of less than one month in 2001, which was 
relatively low in comparison to other developing countries. The KRA was less successful 
at arrears collection. As of 2001 the KRA was owed approximately Kshs 52.8 million, 
representing about 70% of income and domestic VAT collections in that year. The ability 
of the tax agency to collect arrears, however, was also subject to exogenous factors, 
including the judiciary, which has had a major impact on the KRA’s ability to enforce 
collections. 
In the case of the URA taxpayer registration performance was disappointing 
overall. For example, the number of registered taxpayers in the LTO was only 317 in 
2001. Moreover, of these only 86% and 85% paid the corporate income and VAT, 
respectively. At the same time it was reported that LTO’s tax assessments have a high 
error rate. The Internal Revenue Department reported nearly 184,000 registered taxpayers 
in 2001, of which only 39,000 were active, and, of these, only 4,712 and 5,236 (13.4%) 
filed corporate income tax and VAT returns, respectively.
47 Of those filing VAT returns, 
only 50.4% filed returns with payments in May 2001. The low active to registered ratio, 
as well as the high shares of non-filing and non-paying taxpayers, was partly a reflection 
of the inadequacy of the taxpayer registry and partly a reflection of low compliance rates. 
                                                 
47 There are questions about the reliability of URA data on taxpayer registration.   34
The URA was clearly not able to validate its taxpayer registry. Nor was it able to 
strengthen its TIN system by purging it of inactive entries. Though not all of the blame 
should be attributed to the URA (problems, including alleged corruption, in the Registry 
of Companies have undermined URA’s taxpayer registry), the failure to expand the tax 
base (many small firms and informal traders have escaped the presumptive tax, which has 
proved costly to administer) and document taxpayer registration were two of the principal 
failures of the URA reform. 
In terms of compliance management SUNAT, the KRA, and SARS made 
significant progress, while other ARAs have made only minor headway at best. It should 
be noted, however, that of all the performance indicators evaluated, the number and 
quality of audits seem to have fared the worst across the board. 
Peru’s audit presence for its largest taxpayers was estimated at nearly 11% in 
1999. SUNAT’s audit presence at the national level, however, was only 1.45%, yet in 
comparative terms this was an impressive rate (given that this figure includes only actual 
field audits and not other kinds of minor audit acts). These data are even more impressive 
when compared with the pre-reform audit presence. The audit presence in 1991 was 
0.17%, indicating an increase of more than 8,000%. 
An analysis of SUNAT’s audits and audit findings in February 1999 revealed that 
some form of non-compliance (defined as non-compliance with any formal requirement) 
was quite common (the overall non-compliance rate was 75.4%). The non-compliance 
rate was even higher for the largest taxpayers: 90%. While SUNAT’s audits were able to 
uncover non-compliance they were clearly not able to thwart it. 
Mexico, with over six million taxpayers, relied more on mass operations and 
certified public accountant (CPA) audits than it the traditional tax agency audit. On 
average (1996-1998) less than 10% of all the SAT’s audit acts were actual 
comprehensive or specific item field audits. Nearly 61% of the SAT’s audit acts were 
either reviews of CPA reports (including cross-checking of information) or letters to 
taxpayers requesting more information, and over 30% were perfunctory visits to 
taxpayers. 
The SAT’s audit presence, based on office revisions as well as visits, averaged 
2.84% over the period 1996-1998, which was quite high in comparative terms for the   35
general population of taxpayers. If one only takes into actual field audits, the average 
annual audit presence for the general taxpayer population was estimated at 2.65% in 
1998, which was very respectable. 
The SAT also conducted a receipt verification program, in which taxpayers’ 
obligations to comply with printing and issuance of receipts was monitored. The SAT 
visited about 2.5% of taxpayers in 1998 and 1999 and found that on average over 78.5% 
were not complying with legal requirements. Of those visited 70.5% were fined and 7.4% 
were ordered closed for a short period of time. The non-compliance rates for receipt 
regulations in Mexico were similar to the general non-compliance rates in Peru. 
The data on Venezuela indicate that SENIAT’s audit presence varied from 1.00% 
to 2.30% from 1996 to 1999 for all taxpayers (the average over the period was 1.56%).
48 
Removing these audit acts from the calculation, the average audit presence for the period 
was approximately 0.79%, which is quite low compared with Peru and Mexico.
49 
SENIAT’s audit presence for its large taxpayers was considerably higher in 1999, at 
6.1%, though considerably lower than Peru’s. 
The audit findings revealed that roughly 41% of Venezuelan taxpayers were non-
compliant with either the sales, income, or assets tax formal requirements in 1999. 
Further in-depth audits revealed that about 44% of taxpayers were also non-compliant 
with more fundamental aspects of these tax policies. Breaking down the data by large 
taxpayers showed that they were more compliant than the general taxpaying population in 
terms of the sales, income, and assets taxes, but less compliant in terms of receipt 
verification. 
Tax administrations were also empowered to close down firms for a limited 
period of time if firms were found in non-compliance with tax law. Some, like SUNAT, 
made closures a regular feature of compliance management. Others, like SENIAT and the 
SAT used closure much less often. The SAT’s average closure rate in 1997-1998 was a 
mere 0.06%. SUNAT, on the other hand, closed an average of 0.75% of taxpayers (1993-
                                                 
48 These data, however, include a receipt verification program, which is more properly considered an audit 
act than an audit. 
49 Assuming that 50.6% of all audit acts in 1996-1998 were receipt verification, as was the case in Jan.-June 
1999.   36
1994). The temporary closure of non-compliant firms, with the exception of Peru, was 
sorely underused in these countries. 
There was a perception in Kenya that the KRA has contributed to improved tax 
compliance by being tougher and fairer at the same time.
50 As one member of the 
national accountants’ professional association put it, “There is more compliance because 
you expect they (KRA) will come after you and get you at the end of the day.”
51 There 
was a sense that the KRA was “not missing as much as before,” due to both improved 
quantity and quality of audits.
52 One significant advance was the introduction of field 
audits; prior to the KRA only desk audits were performed. Compliance visits were also 
made by KRA staff to business establishments to ensure compliance with certain 
minimum requirements. The KRA also refined its audit selection procedures to rely less 
on auditor discretion and more on quantitative indicators, such as gross profit ratios. 
Audit selection procedures for both income tax and VAT relied on a clearly defined audit 
checklist. The LTO had a policy of contacting non-filers immediately, creating the 
impression that taxpayers were under the KRA’s microscope. 
Audit coverage in the LTO stood at a very respectable rate of 38%. More 
specifically, LTO VAT audit coverage stood at 40% while income tax coverage only 
reached 16%. Of the total amount of audit assessments made in 2001, fully 53% was 
collected, while the rest was contested by taxpayers. This was not an inordinately low 
collection rate, given the problems with tax arrears in Kenya.
53 
The KRA also registered improvement in the audit of non-large taxpayers, 
specifically regarding the VAT. Though audit coverage of the VAT declined from 9% in 
1999 to 5% in 2001, reflecting a near 30% growth rate in registered VAT taxpayers as 
well as an absolute decline in the number of audits performed, the amount assessed per 
audit more than doubled, from an average of 1.2 (1997-1998) to 3.0 (1999-2001) million 
Kshs., representing an improvement in audit quality, even as the number of departmental 
technical staff fell. 
                                                 
50 Compliance may also have increased due to the lowering of tax rates. 
51 Interview, Nairobi, Kenya, 7/6/2001. 
52 Compliance in the informal sector remains a serious problem. 
53 The payment rate reflects taxpayer perceptions about the ease of holding the tax agency at bay over an 
extended period of time. If taxpayers believe that it is unlikely that the tax agency has the capacity and 
resources to pursue the case, and that the court system provides an effective means of resolving disputes to 
the taxpayer’s favor, the actual audit collection rate be low.   37
SARS established a formal audit policy, which it did not have previously, and  
reorganized internally to create “compliance centers” that foster teamwork among 
auditors and between auditors and collections officers. SARS standardized audit 
processes left less room for individual auditor discretion and provided greater focus for 
district offices. SARS also introduced integrated audits in 1998
54 and developed an audit 
strategy that focused more on risk assessment of taxpayers using a new computerized 
audit tool. SARS research department performed threat and industry analysis to aid in 
targeting scarce audit resources. 
SARS’ compliance division, which brought together the audit, investigations, and 
debt collection units promised to enhance intra-organizational cooperation. In fact, before 
1997 the tax administration did not have the capacity to do its own investigative work. 
With autonomy police and intelligence officials were hired from outside to strengthen 
SARS capacity in this important area of compliance. SARS prided itself on having won 
99 years worth of jail sentences in 2000 and 121 years in 2001 for tax fraud. In addition, 
SARS attached shares in two companies as securities for taxes owed; these types of 
measures changed SARS’ image and contributed to greater compliance. 
SARS’s tax assessments issued by auditors also increased. From 2000 to 2001 the 
value of additional tax assessments issued by auditors grew from approximately R 5 
billion to R 6.2 billion, an increase of 24%. Audit yields also increased dramatically, 
especially in income tax and PAYE, as a result of  SARS greater technical and human 
resource capacity. 
Audit coverage, however, declined dramatically, especially in VAT and income 
tax. As the tax rolls expanded, audit quantity did not kept up. The significant decrease in 
coverage likely had had a negative impact on tax compliance. It seems clear that SARS 
reforms did not go far enough, as the organization lacked audit resources, both in terms 
of the quantity and quality of its staff. Moreover, SARS management was dissatisfied 
with the overall quality of its audit staff, citing that “the highly competent auditors only 
form 20% of the audit staff…”
55 
                                                 
54 SARS’ integrated audits have proven to be more productive than the individual tax audit approach. In 
2001, the average yield per integrated audit was R 915,000, as compared with the sum of the average audit 
yield for the VAT, PAYE, and corporate income tax, which was R 101,956 in the same year. 
55 SARS Annual Report, 2000/2001, p. 39.   38
The audit function in the URA remained weak in spite of the reform, though the 
Large Taxpayers Department is better positioned than the rest of the agency. The LTD 
reported a comprehensive audit presence of about 11% in 2001 and also reported using 
third party information to cross-check taxpayer returns (Table 3 summarizes large 
taxpayer audit coverage across several countries). The Internal Revenue Department 
registered an audit presence of about 2.6% in 2001 for filing corporate income tax and 
VAT taxpayers. 
 
TABLE 3. AUDIT COVERAGE OF LARGE TAXPAYERS 
Revenue Authority  Audit Coverage 
KRA (2001) 38% 
SENIAT (1999) 6% 
SUNAT (1999) 11% 
URA (2001) 11% 
   Source: Author’s calculations based on ARA and MOF data. 
In sum the cases show improvement in taxpayer registration, especially in Peru, 
Kenya, and South Africa. The cases show that the more autonomous ARAs have invested 
their resources wisely in their large taxpayers offices. SUNAT and the KRA have focused 
on their LTOs and have managed to improve performance considerably as a result. SARS 
has made progress in expanding the tax rolls and improving filing compliance in the 
income tax. The KRA has also made some progress on expediting refunds. The cases 
show declining performance in Venezuela and stagnation at best in Uganda. There seems 
to be a positive association between the greater autonomy of SUNAT, KRA, and SARS, 
and their relatively better performance. 
With respect to compliance management SUNAT has demonstrated progress in 
comparison to the pre-reform situation, though its performance has not been exceptional 
in this regard. The Mexican case suggests that while the SAT’s performance rates 
positively in comparative perspective, there has not been much improvement as a result 
of the reform. Though SENIAT made some progress with its large taxpayers office, the 
impact of the reform was limited. The KRA made significant progress since the reform, 
instituting new audit guidelines and procedures, introducing field audits, improving audit 
productivity, and boosting audit coverage in the LTO significantly, yielding a high   39
coverage rate in comparative perspective (see Table 3). SARS also improved its audit 
function since the reform, establishing a focused audit policy, standardizing audit 
processes, and improving audit yields. The downside is that SARS audit coverage has 
declined as the tax rolls have grown. URA performance does not seem to have improved 
markedly since the reform, though the situation is better in the LTO as compared with the 
rest of the taxpayer population. 
 
Taxpayer Services 
Several ARAs also made headway in the improvement of taxpayer services, an 
important yet oft-overlooked function of tax agencies. The cases demonstrate that the 
more autonomous revenue authorities have been the ones most concerned with improving 
taxpayer services. Notably, the KRA and SUNAT made significant efforts to improve 
taxpayer services, though these efforts did not always translated into significantly 
improved services. SARS initiatives were still too incipient to judge, but the focus on 
taxpayer services holds promise. SENIAT and the URA made only modest progress. 
Though the KRA attempted to make taxpayer service delivery a key element of its 
reform program, results to date have been less than satisfactory. For example, though the 
KRA introduced a Taxpayers’ Charter, which was intended to provide transparent 
standards of service for taxpayers and serve as a sign of the authority’s interest in making 
tax compliance easier, observers noted that the charter was not put into practice.
56 As 
further evidence of its commitment, the KRA established a VAT customer care help desk 
in its headquarters office, yet services, especially technical advisory ones, were still 
regarded as weak. Even the LTO was regarded as having inferior quality taxpayer 
services. The LTO had difficulty responding promptly and accurately to inquiries. Some 
reported improvements in KRA forms (tax returns, etc.).  
As a result it is probable that KRA’s autonomy did not led to reduced compliance 
costs for taxpayers through better services. In fact, tax professionals argued that because 
of the KRA’s more active, higher quality audit program, compliance costs actually 
increased as taxpayers saw fit to keep more records, and to do so more accurately. One 
                                                 
56 “Taxpayer’s Charter: Taxpayers Rights and Obligations,” KRA.   40
professional from a major tax consulting firm noted that the LTO had been responsible 
for generating more demand from clients for his firm’s services. 
The SARS introduced service desks in all larger customs offices and in some 
larger revenue offices. SARS focused more on taxpayer services by establishing a 
taxpayer services division under a general manager and regional managers and creating 
over forty new integrated service centers around the country.  
The URA, on the other hand, while it has not been radical in its approach to 
improving taxpayer services, noted some improvements. Seminars, pamphlets, and radio 
programs established more regular communication channels with taxpayers and the LTD 
established a taxpayer service desk. Taxpayers noted an improvement specifically with 
regard to communication about changes in tax policy and regulations, though taxpayers 
also complained that the quality of service varied a great deal, depending on the specific 
tax official, and that it was difficult to get answers to specific questions, indicating a 
problem with the provision of specific as opposed to generic information. As a result, 
compliance costs remained high for Ugandan taxpayers. 
In Latin America Peru made the most progress on taxpayers services. For 
example, one stop service offices (“Plaza SUNAT”) were established in many of the 
countries largest cities. In both Peru and Venezuela ARAs focused on improving 
taxpayer services principally for large taxpayers to the detriment of the vast majority of 
individual and small business taxpayers. However, both SUNAT and SENIAT were 
successful in improving basic services for large taxpayers, though to varying extents. 
Some survey results illustrate the point. Regarding the reasonableness of the 
quantity of information required in tax declaration forms, 94% in Venezuela said it was 
Somewhat,  Fairly, or Very Reasonable, as compared with 93% in Peru and 42% in 
Mexico. With respect to the clarity of new regulations issued by the tax agency, Peruvian 
taxpayers expressed much greater satisfaction than taxpayers in the other two countries. 
In terms of the usefulness of tax publications, including guides and manuals, Peru ranked 
highest while the other two cases ranked much lower. In terms of the ease of obtaining 
information from the tax agency, 54% of Peruvian respondents said it was Slightly, 
Fairly, or Very Easy, as compared with 45% in Venezuela, and 38% in Mexico. 
Regarding the reliability of information given by tax agency officials, 68% of Peruvians   41
said it was Somewhat, Fairly, or Very Reliable, as compared with 58% in Venezuela, and 
only 50% in Mexico. The survey data clearly showed that across the board information 




Conclusion: Evidence of an Association between Autonomy and Performance 
The cases demonstrate that the ARA model permits managers to take greater 
control over their organizations and manage them more effectively, though they also 
demonstrate that some ARAs, notably Peru, Kenya, and South Africa (and perhaps 
Venezuela before SENIAT’s autonomy was reduced), were more successful than others 
in improving their performance (Table 4 presents a summary of performance by indicator 
and ARA).
58 
TABLE 4. ARA PERFORMANCE: A SUMMARY COMPARISON 
  Input Indicators  Output and Outcome Indicators 




Collections Registration Compliance Taxpayer 
Services 
KRA  •  Quasi-
voluntary 
retrenchment 
•  Overall staff 
reduction 
•  Selective salary 
increase 
•  Financial 
support for staff 
training 
 
•  Very low 
collection 
costs 














•  Improvement 
in audit 
coverage 
•  Improved 
audit 
procedures 




•  Some 
improvement 
SARS  •  Salary increases 





•  Slight reduction 
in staff 
complement 
•  Excellent 
training 
opportunities 
•  Very low 
collection 
costs 










•  Mixed results 
with filing 
compliance 
•  Improved 
audit 
procedures 
•  Increased 
audit 
productivity 
•  Declining 
audit 
coverage 
•  Improvements 
planned 
URA  •  Periodic salary 
increases 
•  Increase in staff 
complement 
•  High 
collection 
costs 


















SAT  •  No 
retrenchment 
•  Low 
collection 
•  No major 
change 
•  No major 
progress 
•  No major 
change 
•  Some 
improvement 
                                                 
57 Taliercio (2000, 339-341). 
58 A recent IMF report (2003: 100) cites Ecuador as a good example of the positive impact of autonomy on 
tax administration performance.   42
•  No pay increase 
policy 
costs 
SENIAT  •  Voluntary 
retrenchment 
•  Initial reduction 
in staff 
complement 
•  Salary increases 
•  Low 
collection 
costs 













•  Some 
improvement 




•  Substantial 
salary increase 
•  Overall staff 
reduction 




•  Low 
collection 
costs 




•  Expansion of 
tax base 









•  Improved 
audit 
procedures 
•  Moderate 










What accounts for the difference? The cases suggest an association between 
improved performance and greater autonomy. Simply put, ARA managers with greater 
autonomy were able to take reforms farther and faster than those with less autonomy. The 
issue of competent management seems not to have been the binding constraint; most 
cases demonstrated the presence of effective management. Yet when managers’ hands 
were tied by low autonomy, there was less they could do. Thus, the cases suggest that 
autonomy itself, rather than effective management, is the binding constraint. 
At the same time greater autonomy reduces micromanagement in tax 
administration matters by ministries of finance, which, on the whole, seems to be a 
positive outcome. Greater autonomy also reduces political interference, which is 
undoubtedly a positive outcome. 
This is not to say that autonomy was absolutely necessary for these changes to 
take place. There may have been other ways to achieve them. However, in interviews in 
Latin American and Africa, ARA managers repeatedly stressed the importance of being 
able to make decisions more quickly and manage their organizations more flexibly 
responsively as a result of their additional autonomy. For instance, KRA managers report 
that their autonomy has enabled them to take more effective control over personnel 
management by confidently resisting pressure to make staff decisions based on political 
calculations. There is clearly a sense that managers in ARAs feel more empowered than 
they did under the previously existing organizational structure, though many opined that 
they could be even more effective if they had greater managerial autonomy. Thus, though   43
autonomy may not be necessary for certain administrative reforms, such as the creation of 
large taxpayers departments, it most likely enhances the effectiveness of these reforms 
(there are countries in which large taxpayers departments were created, yet in the absence 
of greater administrative autonomy, have yielded little in the way of improved 
performance).
59 
The greater flexibility afforded by the ARA design is increasingly important in 
the increasingly complex environment faced by tax agencies.
60 Over the past dozen years 
there have been three major factors challenging developing country tax administrations:  
(1) economic growth, (2) globalization, and (3) technological change. Bahl and Martínez-
Vazquez argue that economic modernization means that “the job of tax administration 
will become more and more complex…(1992:107).” James and Wallschutzky (1995) 
argue that economic growth in itself has a powerful effect on the ability of a tax 
administration to perform its statutory tasks. They suggest that as wealth increases, 
taxpayer “sources of income will increase in both number and complexity (210).” In 
terms of the individual income tax, for example, in the presence of economic growth, 
families move from having just one major source of income to having several sources. 
Consequently, taxpayers become more differentiated from one another across time and 
space. 
It is clear that the past decade or so has produced enormous change in the way tax 
administrations need to operate. From economic growth to globalization to new 
technologies, the environment of tax administrations has changed substantially. 
Economic growth has increased taxpayers’ occupational and geographical mobility while 
also increasing the sheer number of taxpayers. Growth has also made more numerous and 
diversified the sources and types of taxpayers’ incomes. With higher taxpayer mobility 
and greater numbers of taxpayers, the tax administration is more uncertain about whether 
taxpayers are escaping the tax net as the problems of non-filing and stop-filing become 
more acute. With more numerous sources of income, the tax administration is more 
uncertain about whether it is assessing taxes on the total earned income of the taxpayer. 
                                                 
59 This is not to say that political support was not instrumental in making both autonomy (in the first place) 
and improved performance possible. Indeed, the import of political support for sustainable reform is the 
subject of Taliercio (2004b). 
60 See Taliercio (2000, 14-23) for a fuller discussion.   44
Underreporting of income becomes more problematic as well. Growth has also made 
private sector employment more attractive relative to the public sector, drawing away 
experienced professionals from tax administration. 
At the same time, globalization of markets has meant more open borders and 
greater private capital inflows. World and regional trade agreements have lowered trade 
barriers, thus reducing tax revenues and challenging the mission of customs departments. 
Dealing with many large, modern multinational corporations poses tough new challenges 
for tax administrators. The issues are numerous and vastly complicated, from off-shore 
tax havens to double taxation agreements to transfer pricing to taxation of new financial 
instruments (see, for example, Tanzi, 1995). Many developing country tax 
administrations are not equipped with the resources necessary to deal effectively and 
efficiently with the taxation of multinational corporations.
61 
A technological revolution has also occurred in the past decade with regard to the 
availability of personal computers and more specialized software. Unfortunately, 
however, the public sector in many developing countries has not yet been able to take 
advantage of the new technology. That the private sector has been able to take advantage 
means that the capacity gap between tax administrations and its clients has grown. It is 
for all of these reasons that tax administrators argue that the greater flexibility afforded to 
them by the ARA design is important for their overall success. 
The nature of the autonomy granted to revenue authorities has, by design, been 
limited, which has caused some problems for managers. A central issue is the extent to 
which autonomy can insulate tax agencies from negative political influences. The most 
deleterious interference is associated with political patronage, and ARAs have had 
varying degrees of success fending off patronage-based pressure. 
Other types of political pressure can also have a negative impact. In the case of 
the URA, for example, there has been pressure from higher levels of government to meet 
collection targets, resulting in disproportionate emphasis on tax collections over other 
organizational goals, such as improved taxpayer services. Autonomy has not been able to 
insulate ARAs from undue pressures that interfere with good management. 
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Lastly, in addition to the performance indicators assessed here, survey data have 
also shown that corporate taxpayers in Latin America associate higher levels of autonomy 
with higher levels of performance.
62 That is, perceptions of higher levels of autonomy are 
associated with perceptions of better performance along key dimensions of administrative 
capacity in tax administration. These results, along with the objective performance 
indicators discussed in this section, provide support for the contention that semi-
autonomous revenue authorities are mechanisms to promote credible political 
commitments to reform in developing countries. 
 
IV.  ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN: HOW DOES AUTONOMY MATTER? 
  The ARA reform model is a set of organizational features designed to enhance 
managerial and bureaucratic autonomy. Some features focus on general management, 
while others address financial or personnel autonomy. As the elements of bureaucratic 
autonomy are intertwined, the design features are inherently multifunctional, which 
means that a particular feature will have an impact on multiple dimensions of the 
organization’s autonomy. For example, greater financial autonomy, in addition to 
providing greater control over the use of resources, has the effect of increasing autonomy 
over personnel management. 
The fact that the ARA model is actually a bundled set of reforms has three 
implications. First, there are many ways that an agency can be made more autonomous—
there are a number of variations on the basic model. One agency might have more 
financial autonomy while another might have greater autonomy with respect to corporate 
governance. There is no set accepted best practice. Second, the impact of each particular 
design element cannot be easily isolated from the whole and evaluated rigorously on its 
own. This implies that an evaluation of each individual element must be analyzed ceteris 
paribus. Third, given the plethora of design options and the difficulty in evaluating both 
each feature individually and the set of features taken as a whole, controversies have 
arisen over specific organizational characteristics that these agencies should have. The 
purpose, then, of this section is to set out the main issues in the organizational design of 
semi-autonomous revenue authorities and, based on country experience, offer hypotheses 
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about which design options work better than others and why. That is, if autonomy 
matters, as the previous section argues, how exactly does it matter? 
Semi-autonomous revenue authorities are defined as tax administrations that have 
greater than usual autonomy along several organizational design dimensions, including: 
legal character, corporate governance, financing and budgeting, personnel policy, 
procurement policy, and accountability relationships. Each subsection makes 
recommendations (in box form), based on the experience of the countries under study, for 
increasing organizational autonomy, based on the argument that autonomy has been 
shown to improve performance. The recommendations point to the key design issues that 
must be resolved if the organization is to have effective managerial autonomy. 
In addition the section analyzes how managers from the country cases have used 
these features to promote substantive administrative reform. In discussing management’s 
utilization of these reforms, initiatives are framed in the context of whether they could 
have been undertaken without autonomy. That is, an attempt is made to gauge the real 
impact of autonomy on reform by making judgments about the contribution of autonomy 
to reform, separate from, say, good management or exogenous factors. The intention of 
this section is to develop a series of hypotheses based on the cases that take seriously the 
issue of organizational design, especially given that previous work on tax administration 
reform has not treated these questions with any analytical depth. 
 
Legal Foundations 
National governments have different legal forms they can use to create more or 
less autonomous agencies, according to their constitution and legal tradition (see Table 
5). SUNAT is a decentralized public organization, while SENIAT is an autonomous 
institute. The South Africa Revenue Service (SARS) is a public sector organization 
outside the public service, while the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) is a corporate 
body exempt from the State Corporations Act. The seemingly contradictory language 
used to describe the nature of ARA autonomy in some cases reflects actual contradictions 
and ambiguities in the legal design of these semi-autonomous agencies. 
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TABLE 5.  LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 
  Foundation Form  Character  Patrimony  Creation  Type of 
Autonomy 
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Source: ARA laws, acts, and decrees. 
 
The legal foundation of a ARA defines three important dimensions of autonomy:  
its corporate nature, the ability to own assets, and the nature of its legal underpinnings. 
The corporate status of an ARA depends fundamentally on whether or not it has its own 
separate legal character. ARAs generally have their own separate corporate status (see 
Table 5). ARAs without their own corporate character are inherently less autonomous, as 
shown by the Mexican and Venezuelan cases. Though the impact of not having a separate 
corporate character may not necessarily be experienced as problematic by management 
on a day to day basis, the issue takes on great importance when disputes and ambiguities 
arise over the nature of the ARA’s autonomy. Agencies without their own corporate 
identity are ultimately subject to greater control by external actors. 
Legal Foundation Issue 1: To bolster autonomy ARAs should have their own separate 
corporate character as defined by national law. 
 
The right to own assets is also an important determinant of autonomy. ARAs that 
can own assets are more autonomous in that they are less dependent on the MOF for the   48
use of physical infrastructure, IT systems, and supplies. The right to own assets also 
affords ARAs greater flexibility and predictability in managing their resources. Most 
ARAs can own assets. SENIAT, however, is dependent on the MOF for permission to 
use assets and is subject to ministerial decisions to revoke use rights or reassign assets 
within the ministry. The lack of basic property rights weakens the managerial autonomy 
of the ARA and subjects it to uncertainty in the use and availability of physical assets. 
Legal Foundation Issue 2: To strengthen autonomy ARAs should have the right to own 
assets. 
 
The legal framework of the ARA also defines its place in the hierarchy of public 
administrative law. In some cases ARAs are granted blanket exemptions from public 
administrative law pertaining to staff benefits and procurement, among other things. In 
the case of Kenya the KRA is exempt from the State Corporations Act, which means that 
the tax agency has autonomy over a whole series of administrative issues. In the case of 
Uganda, however, the URA is not exempt from government-wide regulations. On the 
contrary, the authority is defined as an agency of government under the “general 
supervision” of the minister of finance. The fact that the URA is not exempt from 
government-wide civil service regulations has led to problems implementing reform 
measures. In South Africa SARS is defined as “an organ of state within the public 
administration, but as an institution outside the public service.”
63 The distinction 
concerns the fact that though SARS is a public organization it is not part of the civil 
service. 
Legal Foundation Issue 3: To make autonomy effective the ARA should be exempt from 
specific government-wide regulations, including civil service regulations. ARAs might 
also be exempted from government-wide procurement regulations. 
 
The legal foundation of ARAs varies from an act passed by the legislature or 
parliament to a decree promulgated by a president or minister. Most ARAs are founded 
on a legislative or parliamentary decree, which means that the legislative branch of 
government has been involved in most fundamental reform tax agency reforms. This 
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were part of the MOF, were set up as a separate, unified ministry (the SARS Department) under a CEO, as 
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would seem to offer something of a buffer against political winds, as it may be more 
difficult to reverse ARA reform if more than one branch of government is involved. 
Legal Foundation Issue 4: To safeguard autonomy the ARA’s legal foundation should be 
based on legislative, not executive, authority. 
 
With the exception of the Venezuelan case, there is a high degree of convergence 
among ARAs around foundational legal design issues (there is even more intra-regional 
convergence). This basic legal question is thus largely uncontroversial. Most ARAs are 
endowed with the basic elements of autonomy that flow from their legal foundations, 
which is appropriate given that without the basics more sophisticated design features 
become much less meaningful. It would seem that these basic elements—independent 
corporate identity and the right to own assets—are indispensable for building some 
degree of autonomy. At a minimum ARAs ought to be founded in legislative or 
parliamentary law, have independent corporate identities, and be able to own assets. 
These basic features provide a sound foundation upon which meaningful autonomy-
enhancing features may be constructed, which may explain why they are largely 
uncontroversial. 
The one legal design issue that is somewhat controversial, however, concerns the 
position of the ARA vis-à-vis public administrative law. In order for the authority to gain 
a measure of autonomy, it should be exempt from some government-wide regulations 
concerning personnel, and perhaps procurement. For autonomy to be meaningful, the 
ARA should have the ability to design its own systems to substitute for government-wide 
ones. Moreover, if the authority’s legal foundation is silent on these questions, ambiguity 
about its relation to the greater public sector will arise sooner or later. This type of legal 




ARAs are characterized by two general governance models: a chief executive 
officer (CEO) model, used only in Latin America, and a board of directors model, used   50
mostly in Africa and Asia (see Table 6).
64 There are fewer variations among CEO-based 
models and board-based models. The main organizational design difference observed 
within CEO-based models is the appointment of the CEO. 
 
TABLE 6.  GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 G OVERNANCE 
MODEL 
COMPOSITION AND APPOINTMENT 
KRA  Board of Directors  •  Board consists of chairman (appointed by president), the 
CG, the Permanent Sec. (MOF), the Attorney General, 
and six others by virtue of their knowledge and 
experience (appointed by the minister), excluding public 
officers 
•  Minister appoints CG on recommendation of Board 
•  CG, PS, and AG are ex officio members and have no right 
to vote 
•  Minister may terminate board members’ appointment for 
sufficient cause as specified in the Gazette 
•  Minister may terminate CG’s appointment for sufficient 
cause 
SARS  Advisory Board  •  Board consists of up to eight persons (appointed by 
minister of finance), the commissioner, and up to two 
senior SARS employees (named by commissioner) 
•  Minister of finance appoints commissioner after 
consulting with cabinet and advisory board 
URA  Board of Directors •  Board consists of chairperson (appointed by the minister), 
one representative of the MOF, one representative of the 
ministry of trade and industry, one representative of the 
Uganda Manufacturers Association, the CG, and two 
others by virtue of their knowledge and experience in 
taxation (appointed by the minister), excluding public 
officers 
•  Minister appoints CG on recommendation of Board 
Latin America 
SAT  Board of Directors  •  Minister appoints two members (public only) and SAT 
president appoints two high level SAT employees to 
board 
•  President of republic appoints SAT president 
SENIAT  Superintendent  •  Minister appoints superintendent and adjunct 
superintendent 
•  Minister may remove superintendent 
SUNAT  Superintendent  •  President of republic appoints and removes 
superintendent on suggestion of minister of finance 
Source: ARA laws, acts, and decrees. 
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model, while the South African case is the only one in Africa that uses an advisory board instead of a board 
of directors.   51
The governance structure, which determines to a large extent the effective level of 
autonomy, is perhaps the most basic issue of organizational design. The key issue is the 
role of the MOF. Structures in which the minister of finance dominates the governance 
process yield less autonomy. Another issue is whether there should be private sector 
representation on the board, and, if so, whether private sector positions should be fixed in 
the legislation or depend on the discretion of the minister.  In addition, whether the CEO 
should be appointed to a fixed term, as in Malawi and Guatemala, is another important 
design issue.
65 
The role and design of the board of directors is potentially one of the most 
important organizational features of the ARA. The role of the board should be to provide 
guidance on the overall management of the agency, not to engage in the administration of 
the ARA. There are five key design issues: (1) the role of the president and minister of 
finance with respect to board appointments and dismissals, (2) fixed appointments, 
including ex officio members, (3) the nature of tenure on the board, (4) the role of private 
sector representatives, and (5) decision making mechanisms on the board.  
 
Political Control over the Board 
The first issue is the nature and extent of control of the president and minister of 
finance over the board of directors. The chairperson of the board is typically either 
appointed by the president or the minister. In many cases the chair does not serve a fixed 
term and is not approved by the legislature. Given the existence of a board of directors, 
the position of the chairperson is paramount. The degree of autonomy of the chair has a 
direct impact on the degree of autonomy of the ARA. As such, it is preferable that the 
chair be more rather than less autonomous. The chair should thus report directly to the 
president, who should be responsible for appointing and removing him. In addition, to 
augment the chair’s credibility and increase the chances that the chair is not seen as 
politically dependent on the government, the chair should be appointed to a fixed term 
subject to removal only for pre-specified reasons and his appointment should be approved 
by the legislature. Though the minister of finance would play an informal advisory role, it 
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would be preferable that he not play a direct role in appointing or removing the 
chairperson of the ARA board. 
Corporate Governance Issue 1: To strengthen autonomy the chairperson of the board of 
directors should be appointed by the president, approved by the legislature, and subject to 
a fixed term of service. 
 
Board Composition: Ex Officio Members 
ARAs have approached the issue of board composition quite differently. Some, 
like Kenya and Mexico, allow the minister a free hand in naming and removing 
appointees. Others, like Uganda and Malawi, specify board positions to be filled by 
individuals in certain positions. Almost all ARAs, however, use some fixed positions to 
determine board composition, though in many cases these positions are ex officio. In the 
Kenyan case three government representatives sit on the board, though they are ex officio 
and thus cannot vote. As most ex officio positions are governmental, using them as fixed 
positions establishes a line of communication between the ARA and other government 
departments, but does not allow those other entities to dominate board decision making. 
In some cases ex officio members are quite powerful individuals, viz. the Permanent 
Secretary of the MOF (PS-MOF). Installing these powerful public sector representatives 
on the board as voting members might create an imbalance, giving too much influence to 
other public sector entities, namely the MOF. Allowing for institutionalized 
representation of the MOF on the board in an ex officio capacity provides for a formal 
line of communication without allowing the MOF to micromanage, and perhaps 
dominate, the board. 
Corporate Governance Issue 2: Public sector representatives on the board of directors 
should serve in an ex officio (i.e., non-voting) capacity to increase revenue authority 
autonomy. 
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Board Composition: Private Sector Members 
The use of non-ex officio fixed positions has two effects. First, it limits the 
influence of the minister of finance on the board for the simple reason that she is not 
empowered to appoint the entire board. Second, it institutionalizes the influence of 
certain interest groups, whether the civil service, government ministries, professional 
associations, or economic groups. It may establish a center of power on the board that is 
more autonomous from the MOF in particular and the government in general. The 
potential benefits of establishing fixed positions with voting rights are greater autonomy 
for the ARA and the guarantee that interests affected by the tax agency will have input 
into how the agency is managed. The first potential benefit applies whether the fixed 
position is in the public or private sectors. The point is that these board members are not 
necessarily beholden to the MOF or the government (though if they are appointed by the 
government they may well represent the interest of the appointing authorities). 
The second potential benefit accrues largely to the tax agency’s main constituents: 
taxpayers. There are a number of arguments for having representatives of taxpayers on 
the ARA board. For one taxpayer representatives can provide invaluable information to 
the agency on compliance and corruption costs faced by taxpayers. Taxpayer 
representatives could easily and reliably identify critical bottlenecks and problems in tax 
administration. They could also suggest solutions, based on their private sector 
experience. That is, taxpayer representatives would eliminate the asymmetric information 
problem that exists between the tax agency and themselves. 
Private sector representatives on the board could also help free the tax agency 
from negative political influences. Private sector representatives could monitor the ARA  
with an eye to detecting and uncovering politically motivated actions and corruption. As 
presumably independent of the government, private sector board members could credibly 
oppose political interference, as in the Kenyan case (see Taliercio, 2003b), and offer 
support for professional administration. If they occupied fixed positions, they could do so 
without fear of reprisal as their tenure on the board would not be subject to discretionary 
removal by the government. 
However, there are potential costs to the inclusion of private sector 
representatives on the board: there is a danger of a conflict of interest (see Jenkins, 1994).   54
This problem would materialize if a private sector representative were more interested in 
using his/her position to obtain private benefits than to advise on making tax 
administration more effective and fair. This potential cost might be more likely to occur 
if the board member were representing specific economic interests as opposed to a 
professional group. This potential cost could be mitigated through the use of conflict of 
interest provisions in the ARA’s founding legislation, coupled with a vigilant board. 
Moreover, in the cases with private sector representation of the board, there have 
not been any documented public cases of conflict of interest problems, though there have 
been allegations of problems in both Uganda and Kenya. In Uganda some hold the 
perception that the Uganda Manufacturers’ Association (UMA) unfairly uses its position 
on the URA board to lobby for measures that favor the manufacturing sector. Whether 
these allegations are true or not, they do damage the credibility of the tax agency. 
Representatives of private sector professional associations, such as accountants and 
attorneys, are less susceptible to charges of conflict of interest and may also have the 
broader vision of the tax system necessary for adding value to the board’s decision 
making processes. 
Another potential cost is that the tax agency would lose its ability to act 
strategically. As the private sector will presumably know the compliance strategy of the 
agency, it loses the benefit obtained from private sector uncertainty about, say, the audit 
rate. However, if the agency’s compliance program is effective, this should not be a 
major concern. 
The role of private sector representatives on the board would depend to some 
extent on the level of development of private sector organizations and the larger 
relationship between the government and the private sector. If private sector 
organizations and professional interest groups are cohesive, their impact on the board 
might very well be salutary. If private sector organizations are beholden to an 
authoritarian government, their representation on the board will do little to generate 
autonomy.  
There are two ways to place private sector representatives on the board. The 
minister may be free to appoint them, as in the Kenyan case, or they may be fixed in the 
legislation, as in the Ugandan case. Having them fixed in law is more credible because   55
they are more likely to be freer from governmental influence. The minister, if free to 
appoint them, may revert to appointing former colleagues, as in the Kenyan case, which 
might not always be the best approach. If a board of directors is thought necessary, it 
follows that a board that is not handpicked by the minister of finance is also necessary. 
What the cases show is that in Kenya, in which the board had some autonomy, 
private sector representation seemed to reinforce that autonomy. In Uganda, on the other 
hand, in which the board was weaker, private sector representation did not seem to have 
much of an impact. In South Africa, in which the board has an advisory role only, 
representatives from reputable private sector organizations bolstered the credibility of the 
board and thus the SARS. 
Corporate Governance Issue 3: Private sector representatives from reputable professional 
associations and business groups, whose positions are fixed in the legislation, can bolster 
ARA autonomy by insulating it from negative political interference. 
 
Board Tenure and Appointment 
The third issue is the nature of tenure on the board. In most countries tenure is 
loosely specified. Provisions for appointment and dismissal grant the minister of finance 
a great deal of discretion. If board members do not have some security of tenure, 
however, their ability to provide independent guidance might be compromised. In fact, in 
Kenya board members have been fired en masse over disagreements with the 
government. Security of tenure is thus an indispensable element of board autonomy. The 
exact provisions would vary from country to country, but at a minimum board members 
should be appointed for fixed terms, subject to removal only for malfeasance or 
incapacitation. Moreover, consideration should be given to requiring that dismissal of the 
chairperson be subject to the approval of the legislature. Strong tenure provisions would 
not only protect members but would provide incentives to the government to take the 
appointment process very seriously. Equally important is the nature of board 
appointments. Subjecting them to approval by the legislature, as in Guatemala, can help 
reduce political partisanship and improve the credibility of the organization. 
Corporate Governance Issue 4: To protect autonomy board members should be appointed 
to fixed terms. To enhance accountability board members should be nominated (multiple 
nominees per position) by the MOF and appointed by the legislature. 
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The final design issue is the decision making process on the board. Most boards 
operate under a simple majority-based voting system. In the event of a tie vote, many acts 
provide the chairperson with the tie-breaking vote. 
 
Contentious Autonomy:  Governance in Practice 
Taken together, the features described above determine how meaningful revenue 
authority is in practice. A comparison of way boards have operated in practice in the 
Kenyan, Ugandan, South African, and Mexican cases shows how board design can have 
an important impact on reform outcomes (see Box 2). The Ugandan, Kenyan, South 
African, and Mexican cases raise an interesting question about the role of the board of 
directors and its relationship with the MOF. The cases show that the SARS board, 
because of its advisory nature, and the URA and SAT boards, because of their dominance 
by the MOF, have added little value to the ARA reform process. The KRA board, on the 
other hand, has played a much more important, and in some cases catalytic, role in the 
reform. Thus, boards with some degree of autonomy have played a much more useful 
role than boards with little or no autonomy at all. On one level the point is obvious: why 
create a board of directors dominated by the MOF if the point of the reform is to create a 
different kind of tax agency? 
 
Box 2. Managing Autonomy: Boards of Directors in Africa and Latin America 
 
Compared to Uganda, the Kenyan model uses a stronger board of directors, the chairperson of 
which is appointed by the president while the other six member are appointed by the minister of finance. 
Neither the chairperson nor the other six members may be public officials. The chairperson can be 
dismissed by the president unconditionally while the other board members can be dismissed by the minister 
for specific reasons cited in the act, or for other sufficient cause, which the minister must specify in the 
public record.
66 The requirement that the minister publicly specify the cause for dismissal is intended to 
protect board members from undue political interference. 
The design of KRA’s board purposely limits the extent of government involvement in the 
management of the authority by allowing full voting membership for only non-public officials. The design 
also, however, grants a great deal of power to the minister, who appoints and dismisses the private sector 
board members. The design thus has the contradictory tendencies of empowering the private sector 
members on the one hand and empowering the minister of finance on the other hand. The intent seems to 
be to produce a board that is responsive directly and exclusively to the minister and the president (through 
the chairperson), and insulated from other public sector influence. However, given the power of the 
minister to configure the board to his liking, the board will ultimately reflect the preferences and goodwill 
of the minister, the intention of the law notwithstanding. 
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Another important aspect of autonomy is the tenure of the board chairperson, board members, and 
the CG. The tenure of KRA board chairmen has averaged only 1.6 years from 1995-2001
67, though the act 
allows the chair, like the other members, to serve a maximum of two three-year terms. The fact that the 
KRA board has had four chairmen in six years raises questions about security of tenure. Board members 
(excluding chairmen and ex officio members) have fared better, averaging 2.8 years per person-term. 
Several have even been reappointed after finishing a first term. However, they still fall somewhat short of 
the minimum three year term. The KRA’s CG is also appointed by the minister. The KRA has had four 
CGs since 1995, the first three of whose terms averaged 1.8 years.
68 Moreover, three of the four CGs have 
had previous government experience; only one came from the private sector without any prior government 
experience. 
The data indicate a high rate of turnover for chairmen and a relatively high rate for board 
members, which suggests that board membership is not characterized by security of tenure. Both the 
president and the minister have a relatively free hand in determining board membership and they appear to 
use it liberally. No board members were removed since the public disclosure provision was added to the act 
in 1999 (as of mid-2001), though it is unknown whether this can be attributable to the provision. 
The relatively high turnover rate of board chairpersons and members would seem to indicate that 
both the autonomy of the board and the CG are unstable. The KRA design thus provides some modicum of 
autonomy, but due to the contradictory tendencies of the appointment and removal features, the autonomy 
is not absolute in practice. 
The URA board of directors is composed of several government representatives, one private sector 
representative, and several members appointed by the minister. The ex officio government members are 
representatives of the MOF and the ministry of trade and industry; the CG also sits on the board. The 
private sector representative is from the Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA). In addition, the 
minister is authorized to appoint the chairperson and two other members who are not public officers. 
The URA board is designed to be squarely under the control of the minister of finance. The 
composition of the board is such that the minister appoints five of its seven members, including the 
chairperson and the CG. Board appointees can be initially appointed for a maximum of three years, but can 
be renewed for an additional three year period. Board members, including ex officio members, can be 
dismissed by the minister, however, for reasons of malfeasance or incapacitation, or “for any other 
sufficient cause,” according to the URA act. The problem is that there is no mechanism for interpreting 
what constitutes sufficient cause; presumably, the minister would make this interpretation. This clause 
effectively means that board members do not have security of tenure. Moreover, the act stipulates that “the 
minister may give directions to the board regarding the performance of its functions and it shall be the duty 
of the board to comply with those directions.”
69 The design of the board thus makes it an instrument of 
ministerial control. 
Membership on the first board (September 1991-September 1997) was nominally quite stable. The 
appointed members, though not public officers, did have political backgrounds or connections, making the 
entire board membership public sector-related. According to one senior MOF official, the board is “weak” 
because it is more political than technical. According to another official, the board needs to be 
“professionalized” even more. By all accounts, the current board (2001) has not been very active (for 
example, it has not established staff or finance committees). A former URA commissioner regards the 
board as a “rubber stamp.” The board’s inactivity may reflect the fact that the MOF has full control of the 
board, both in terms of the numbers (a majority of MOF-appointees) and in appointing “political” as 
opposed to “technical” members. 
The design of the URA board is such that as a mechanism of corporate governance it is completely 
dominated by the MOF. Given MOF control of the board, one may question the board’s value added. Even 
with MOF control of the board, a professional, technical board could still be useful for imparting guidance 
and advice. However, if the board is more political than technical, this potential benefit goes unrealized. 
The result is that the URA board, as currently configured, serves no useful purpose. Its lack of 
independence has vitiated its role in the governance of the URA. Given that the board has the potential to 
be the most important reinforcement of URA’s autonomy, it is thus understandable that URA’s autonomy 
in practice has been quite limited. According to a senior member of parliament, who worked on the reform 
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of the URA statute, “The independence of the URA is doubtable. There is a lot of political interference, 
although by law it’s supposed to be independent.”
70 
The URA statute also provides for a CG, appointed by the minister on the recommendation of the 
board, as the ARA’s chief executive officer. The CG effectively serves at the pleasure of the minister, who 
can remove him for malfeasance, incapacitation, or “any other sufficient cause.” In the original statute the 
CG was “subject to the general supervision and control of the Board,” though this phrase was deleted in the 
reform of the statute in 1998.
71 The CG actively works with the MOF on a regular basis and the link 
between the CG and the MOF seems in practice to be more important than the relationship between the CG 
and the board. The position of CG, however, is clearly subordinated to the minister, to the extent that major 
decisions have to be cleared by the minister, who has an informal veto over URA actions. 
The South African ARA uses a weak version of the board of directors model.  SARS’ board, in 
fact, is purely advisory. The board consists of up to eight members named by the minister, up to two senior 
SARS employees named by the commissioner, and the commissioner himself. The minister also appoints 
the chairperson from among the members already named. The members serve a maximum term of five 
years, which is renewable. The minister may terminate a member’s term “for a sufficient reason.” A 
provision in the SARS act also requires the board to “inform the minister of any advice it gives to the 
commissioner.”
72 
In practice both SARS senior managers and private sector observers acknowledge that the board 
has played a very limited role, which seems to have decreased over time. Some private sector 
representatives of peak organizations confessed ignorance not only of the board’s membership but also of 
the board’s role in the management of SARS. The board has played, however, a very limited role in the 
management of SARS through its standing committees, principally the audit and remunerations 
committees. The audit committee reviews quarterly reports from the internal audit unit while the 
remuneration committee provides advice on remuneration policies for senior managers. Still, as a result of 
the minor role played by the advisory board thus far, its usefulness has been called into question and its 
future is under review. 
Mexico is sui generis among the Latin American ARAs as it is the only one to use a board of 
directors instead of a strong superintendent. In Mexico the SAT’s board of directors (junta de gobierno) is 
composed of the following members: the minister of finance, two representatives from the ministry as 
designated by the minister, the president of the SAT, and two representatives from the SAT designated by 
the president. Given that all board members are from the MOF and the SAT, there is no space on the board 
for extra-governmental participation. In fact, the composition of the board is more akin to a 
technical/advisory board than an executive one. 
The SAT law endows the board of directors with all important decision making authority, and 
guarantees the minister ultimate control over the board, thus clearly subordinating the SAT to ministerial 
control. In fact in practice the board has not played a very important role in either the management of SAT 
or in tax policy making. This has happened for two related reasons. First, given the closed composition of 
the board (top management of the MOF and SAT), the board does not offer much beyond what top 
management already has to offer (and many of them meet formally and informally outside of formal board 
meetings). Second, given the minister’s complete control, the board has become somewhat superfluous. 
The board met infrequently during the first few years of the SAT’s existence and key decisions were taken 
by the undersecretary for revenue and the minister without the formal consent of the board. Given the fact 
that the ministry has ultimate control of the SAT, the board has been seen as weak and ineffective, which 
has resulted in its being bypassed by informal decision making mechanisms. 
 
Indeed, there has been confusion about how to provide autonomy from the 
government while also ensuring accountability to the government at the same time. The 
result has been the creation of boards of directors that are pulled in different directions by 
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71 URA Statute, 1991, Section 10 (2). 
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poorly designed governance mechanisms. Rather, I would argue, it makes more sense to 
grant the board a modicum of autonomy and to build in accountability mechanisms in the 
relationships between the board and the MOF, the monitoring agencies of the executive, 
and the legislature (accountability mechanisms are addressed below). The four 
suggestions outlined above would reduce MOF control over ARA boards, thus providing 
for greater autonomy. 
In contrast to the African cases, the Latin American models have relied more on 
superintendents than boards of directors. Both Peru and Venezuela use superintendents, 
or CEOs, though Venezuela’s revenue authority is characterized by a weak corporate 
governance mechanism. 
SENIAT is managed by the superintendent and the adjunct superintendent, both 
of whom are named and removed by the minister of finance. Granting the minister the 
authority to name and remove the superintendent has clearly subordinated the ARA to the 
minister. In Venezuela the minister has used his authority to force his positions on the 
superintendent and has removed the superintendent for differences of opinion. In fact the 
average term of a superintendent has been merely 10.5 months over the period 1994-
2000, with a take over of SENIAT by the MOF in late 1999 (that is, the post of 
superintendent remained vacant as direct control was exercised from the MOF). After the 
initial periods of reform (at the start of both the Caldera and Chávez administrations) the 
minister has had complete control over the superintendent, obviating in large measure the 
autonomy of the authority. In the Venezuelan system there are few effective checks on 
the minister’s control over SENIAT, which means in practice that the ARA must depend 
on the goodwill and support of the MOF to carry out a reform agenda. 
Peru’s SUNAT is unique among the African and Latin American cases with 
respect to its high level of autonomy. SUNAT’s superintendent is named and removed by 
the president of the republic, on the suggestion of the minister of finance with the 
approval of the council of ministers. Initially, the minister of finance had no say in the 
naming of the superintendent in practice (the first two superintendents were named by the 
president without the consultation of the minister). The average term served by SUNAT’s 
superintendents was 1.8 years over the period 1991-2000 (excluding the tumultuous end 
of the Fujimori administration).   60
The naming of the superintendent by the president, as the law provides, is a 
mechanism that has increased the autonomy of the ARA. However, providing the MOF 
with advise and consent powers has reduced the ARA’s autonomy on some occasions. 
Depending on the relationship between the president and the minister, the minister may 
play more or less of a role in decisions about the superintendent and his tenure. In Peru 
the minister came to gain effective control over the nomination and removal process, 
thereby subordinating governance of SUNAT to the MOF, which was not necessarily a 
positive development. 
The Latin American cases are all characterized by corporate governance 
mechanisms that feature strong MOF control, ranging from the MOF’s outright 
dominance of the ARA’s in Mexico and Venezuela to the more subtle influence of the 
MOF in Peru’s ARA. In both the Mexican and Venezuelan cases the ARA’s autonomy is 
quite limited in the area of corporate governance. This means that the ARAs have had to 
rely on the goodwill of the MOF, which was less forthcoming in the Mexican than the 
Venezuelan case. In the Venezuelan case a reform-minded minister of finance enabled 
the SENIAT experiment to take off in an impressive manner. The experiment was cut 
short less than two years later with the arrival of a new minister, however. In Peru the 
appointment mechanism of the superintendent requires the input of the minister, which 
has meant that as the interest of the president waned the influence of the minister grew. 
This again subjects the ARA to the goodwill of the MOF and is likely to weaken agency 
autonomy. 
In practice the SARS commissioner is more like the Latin American 
superintendent, that is, a powerful CEO. The commissioner is appointed by the minister 
after consulting with both the cabinet and advisory board. The commissioner’s term, 
which is renewable, cannot exceed five years. The first commissioner, who was the 
previous commissioner of income tax, was closely involved in the ARA reform. Given 
that the SARS act limits the authority of the commissioner vis-à-vis the minister, the fact 
that the current commissioner has been quite powerful must mean that some of his 
authority derives from his relationship with the minister as well as the general disposition   61
of the minister toward the ARA.
73 The concern is that the SARS corporate governance 
arrangement might operate very differently with a different set of actors. That is, the 
autonomy of the ARA is less institutionalized than in other cases and depends a great 
deal on individuals. 
Though the Peru case demonstrates that the superintendent model can yield 
positive results, there is an argument to be made that the board of directors variant is 
preferable to the superintendent variant for a number of reasons. First, the superintendent 
model vests enormous power in a single individual, while the board model provides for a 
separation of power between the board and the CEO. Second, the board may provide for 
greater accountability, as it is charged with supervising the ARA’s CEO directly. Third, 
the board can serve as a bulwark to protect the ARA from negative political interference. 
Corporate Governance Issue 5: For greater autonomy and accountability, the board of 
directors model is preferred to the superintendent model.  
 
This section has tackled the thorny question of ARA corporate governance and, 
based on the case studies, argues that the key design issue is fashioning a governance 
mechanism that yields some degree of autonomy. Whether the board of directors or 
superintendent model is used, if the ARA is subject to MOF control, autonomy will be 
quite limited in practice. The cases show that it is important not to confuse autonomy and 
accountability in the design of the governance structure. Rather, autonomy and 
accountability should be built into the governance structure separately. Trying to build 
both autonomy and accountability into the same design features muddles the governance 
mechanism.  
 
Funding Mechanisms and Budget Formulation 
The design of funding mechanisms for semi-autonomous ARAs centers on two 
key issues: (1) whether funding is automatically earmarked for the authority; and (2) 
whether funds are directly retained by the ARA (see Table 7). 
TABLE 7.  FUNDING MECHANISM 
 S OURCES OF INCOME T RANSFER OF FUNDS 
                                                 
73 The relationship between the MOF and SARS is quite close at present (2001); the SARS executive 
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AFRICA 
KRA  •  1.5% of estimated collections 
•  3% of the difference between actual and 
estimated collections 
•  Maximum limit:  2% of collections 
•  1.5% of collections done for other 
organizations 
•  Direct and indirect tax funds released 
by treasury 
•  Direct retention of 1.5% of collections 
done for other organizations 
SARS  •  Parliamentary appropriation  •  Funds released by ministry 
URA  •  Parliamentary appropriation  •  Funds released by ministry 
LATIN AMERICA 
SAT  •  Congressional appropriations 
•  Additional resources based on agency’s 
efficiency and productivity 
•  Funds released by ministry 
SENIAT  •  Between 3% and 5% of non-petroleum 
tax collections, as determined by the 
president of the republic 
•  Funds released by ministry 
SUNAT  •  2% of tax collections 
•  25% of property auctions 
•  0.2% of non-treasury revenues 
•  Funds retained (deposited directly) by 
SUNAT 
Source: ARA laws, acts, and decrees. 
 
Of the Latin American cases SUNAT’s financing mechanism is the most 
autonomous. The Venezuelan and Mexican revenue authorities, on the other hand, have 
much weaker funding mechanisms (see Table 7). SENIAT is supposed to be financed by 
“between 3% and 5% of non-petroleum taxes” it collects. The president of the republic is 
responsible for determining the percentage on an annual basis. In fact, SENIAT has not 
received more than 2% of collections. The SAT is financed by a hybrid mechanism in 
which normal congressional appropriations are supposed to be supplemented by 
additional resources based on its “productivity and efficiency.” The additional resources, 
which have not been provided, are supposed to be used for improving infrastructure, 
improving taxpayer services, modernizing its processes, and to fund the Fiscal Career 
Service.
74 
This paper argues for a fixed percentage based funding mechanism (based on 
actual revenues) on two counts: substituting for dysfunctional PEM systems and 
providing stronger incentives for collection (see Box 3 for a full discussion based on 
existing models). Clearly, the PEM substitution argument only makes sense if the PEM 
system is indeed dysfunctional. In that case, the percentage-based funding mechanism 
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could help insulate the ARA from poor public expenditure management. This in turn 
would help to stabilize revenue collections, which would feed back greater stability into 
the PEM cycle. 
Funding Issue 1: A fixed percentage-based funding mechanism, coupled with other 
design features, can provide greater operational autonomy, and, if properly linked to a 
staff performance bonuses, can enhance incentives for increasing collections. 
 
Box 3. The Percentage-Based Funding Mechanism: Insights from Peru and Kenya 
 
The percentage-based funding mechanism is one in which some fixed or variable percentage of 
funds is automatically earmarked for the authority ex ante. The theory behind the percentage-based funding 
mechanism is two-fold. First, proponents argue that the mechanism insulates ARAs from the vagaries of 
poor PEM processes by legally guaranteeing them a share of revenues, thus providing for greater budgetary 
stability. In countries in which budget execution does not closely correspond to approved budget 
allocations, and in which resources are not released in a timely or predictable manner, the percentage-based 
funding mechanism is thought to provide agencies with greater budgetary certainty and thus reliability. 
Based on its projected collections, the ARA would know exactly how much it would receive. The only 
uncertainty in its budget would be fluctuations in revenues. An important source of fluctuations—in-year 
resource reallocation by the treasury—would cease to be a problem. In fact, the cases show that in countries 
with inadequate PEM systems, the percentage-based mechanism fares no better than the traditional 
legislative appropriations method. The percentage mechanism cannot deliver resource predictability on its 
own. 
The second reason given for the mechanism is that giving ARAs a percentage of the revenues they 
collect strengthens their incentives to boost collections. Assessing the validity of this argument requires a 
more thorough discussion. The cases serve to illustrate the key issues. In the simplest case, exemplified by 
Peru, a fixed two percent of actual collections is earmarked for the authority (according to the SUNAT 
law). A variant on this basic case employs a dual percentage-based mechanism, in which the base budget is 
equal to a fixed percentage of revenues and an additional performance-based component is added if 
collections exceed the estimated target. This variant is exemplified by the Kenyan case, in which the base 
budget is equal to 1.5% of estimated revenues and the performance component is calculated as three 
percent of the difference between actual and estimated collections (subject to a total maximum of two 
percent).  
The two prototypical cases are shown graphically in Figure 2, which highlights the two main 
differences between the mechanisms. In the Kenyan case the fact that the base percentage is a function of 
estimated revenues assures the KRA of a fixed amount of income, irrespective of collections. 
Consequently, if collections were less than the estimated amount, the KRA’s budget would remain 
constant, whether the gap were one percent or ten. On the other hand, for every increment in collections 
over the estimate, KRA would be rewarded with an additional three percent of the difference. Peru’s 
authority, on the contrary, is not guaranteed any base budget but it is rewarded two percent of every 
increment in collections. 
Peru’s mechanism would seem to be superior to Kenya’s for two reasons. First, and most 
importantly, defining the performance component as a function of estimated revenues places a great deal of 
importance on the quality of the estimation. In some sense the ARA would benefit or suffer as a result of 
measurement error. More problematic, however, is the possibility that such a formula would give both the 
ARA and the MOF incentives to behave strategically by setting revenue estimates to maximize budgets. 
This is complicated by the fact that the ARA usually plays an important role in the revenue estimation 
process.
75 Moreover, the situation is characterized by asymmetric information, as the ARA has information 
                                                 
75 Indeed, in one of the cases investigated the MOF complained that the ARA for strategic reasons routinely 
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about individual taxpayers (investment plans, for example) that the MOF does not have. In a word, such a 
formula creates a conflict of interest for the ARA. 
Secondly, the Peruvian funding mechanism provides consistent incentives to increase collections 
over the entire range of revenues. The Kenyan mechanism provides no incentives over a certain range 
(from zero to the estimated revenues), but then provides stronger incentives beyond that (and up to a 
maximum). The Kenyan model has the potential to induce distortions in the ARA incentive scheme, 
providing incentives that are too weak at the low end of collections and incentives that are too strong at the 
high end. The advantage of the Peruvian model is that it provides stable incentives on every incremental 
amount of collections. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, it is administratively much simpler, as it is 
not subject to strategic manipulation. 
Critics of the Peruvian variant of the percentage-based mechanism could point out that it is riskier 
for the tax agency on the grounds that a sudden decrease in revenues could destabilize the organization. 
Revenue shortfall due to some catastrophe (for example, a natural disaster) or significant reductions in 
certain commodity prices could indeed have a major impact on the agency’s budget. In the event of a 
severe shock, the government would have to intervene, either to modify the tax system or provide 
additional revenues (for salaries, say) to the tax agency.
76 These cases, however, would be quite rare. 
A further criticism of any percentage-based funding mechanism is that it subjects the ARA to 
forces beyond its control, whether positive or negative. Given that tax agency efforts only determine a 
limited share of revenues collected, the agency could experience shortfalls or windfalls through no fault or 
merit of its own, as is the case in traditional appropriations-based budgeting. This problem could be 
somewhat mitigated by allowing the ARA to carry over unspent funds from year to year, thereby providing 
for income smoothing and encouraging the judicious use of resources. To the extent that the mechanism 
actually worked by providing greater incentives to increase collections, the undue portion of funds accruing 
to the ARA could be seen as the cost in some sense of establishing the incentive system. 
The strongest criticism of the mechanism could come from the organizational economics school. 
The argument might be that a percentage-based funding mechanism like the Peruvian or Kenyan ones 
might provide incentives to the top management to increase collections, but it does not necessarily follow 
that these incentives would flow down to the staff. The reasoning is that if individual staff remuneration 
were not linked directly to collections, then staff would simply not have greater incentives to collect. Even 
if individual remuneration were linked to collections, it would be difficult to evaluate the performance of 
individual employees in light of their contribution to greater collections. This measurement problem would 
create room for shirking as some would undoubtedly free ride on the efforts of others, which would create 
additional incentive problems for the good performers.
77 
The organizational economics argument makes clear that linking ARA funding with staff 
remuneration is critical for enhancing incentives. A funding mechanism unlinked to staff remuneration in 
some way would be inefficient and, at worst, irrelevant. Senior management should have to take 
responsibility for rewarding staff based on good performance. Prescribing specific mechanisms for 
rewarding good performance in the ARA statute is unnecessary; rather, these decisions should be taken by 
senior management and the board on an annual basis. This would give them the flexibility to reward staff 
based on some type of administratively-appropriate performance evaluation system. 
 
However, the case studies show that an additional feature—direct retention of 
funds—can have a major impact at the operational level. That is, the fixed-percentage 
mechanism by itself is not sufficient to guarantee actual allocation of resources to the 
ARA, as the cases of Kenya and Venezuela show. Given a fixed percentage mechanism 
based on actual collections, direct retention of funds by the ARA would be the most 
efficient way to support successful implementation, as the Peruvian case shows. The 
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ARA would simply retain its percentage of collections before transferring the difference 
to the treasury. Experience shows, moreover, that the percentage based funding 
mechanism is much less likely to work when the funds must still be parceled out by 
treasury; poor PEM systems have a record of undermining special funding mechanisms. 
Indeed, the record shows that percentage-based funding mechanisms without the 
direct deposit feature have performed poorly. The KRA financing mechanism, for 
example, is percentage-based with a special provision for performance bonuses (see 
Table 7). In practice the KRA has received less than the statutorily-required 1.5% and has 
not received any performance bonuses. From 1995-2000 the KRA received an average of 
1.2% of total estimated revenues. Including the foregone performance bonuses, by 2000 
the treasury owed KRA the equivalent of 1.62% of total revenues in 1999/2000, that is, 
more than its annual budget (approximately Kshs. 2.7 billion). 
Funding Issue 2: Direct retention of funds by ARAs can help mitigate the negative 
impacts of operating in a dysfunctional PEM system. 
 
ARAs have also shown themselves to be entrepreneurial in reaching for additional 
taxes and fees to collect. For example, after signing an agreement with the Peruvian 
Social Security Institute, SUNAT collects social security fees and receives 2% of those 
collections. As of 2001 SARS is also collecting the Skills Development Levy on behalf 
of the Department of Labor and is authorized to retain two percent of collections to cover 
its costs. In the case of SARS, the percentage-based funding mechanism is used in 
addition to the traditional parliamentary appropriations method. The most important non-
tax revenue collected by the KRA is the road maintenance levy, of which the KRA 
retains 1.5% directly before transferring the difference to the treasury. 
ARAs have also been granted varying control over their own budget formulation. 
In Africa budget formulation in many cases is a matter managed by the ARA board and 
its management. In the case of the KRA it is the board of directors that approves the 
allocation of the budget (within the aggregate limit set by the MOF, since the funding 
mechanism has been inoperable); the MOF plays no formal role. The KRA’s budget is 
included as a line item in the MOF’s budget in the MTEF. The KRA thus has a good deal 
of operational autonomy in budget formulation. Similarly, the URA, once an aggregate 
budget ceiling is set, has autonomy to allocate its resources internally, with the nominal   66
approval of the board. As part of the MTEF SARS prepares a draft budget plus outer year 
projections, dividing its estimates into a baseline (based on the previous year) and new 
initiatives. The MOF makes the decision and informs the SARS of its aggregate budget 
ceiling for the coming fiscal year. The minister does have the discretion, however, to 
adjust SARS’s appropriations during the year. SARS is authorized to alter in-year 
allocations as necessary without the approval of the MOF. SARS is not, however, 
authorized to retain funds beyond the fiscal year, unless authorized by the minister. 
In Latin America budgetary autonomy varies considerably from case to case. The 
budget of the SAT must be approved by its board of directors, which means that the 
ministry maintains ultimate control on budgetary matters. In addition SENIAT’s budget 
must be approved by the MOF. The SAT and SENIAT are controlled not only in terms of 
the total amount of their budgets but also the allocation of expenditures across general 
categories, thus limiting their autonomy. 
SUNAT has more budgetary autonomy. SUNAT’s budget is a direct function of 
the amount of taxes collected and SUNAT has complete autonomy with respect to budget 
formulation. SUNAT’s budget is reviewed, however, by the Office of State Institutions 
and Organizations (OIOE), though only in terms of whether the budget is consistent with 
the government’s overall macroeconomic goals. On occasion, the OIOE has asked 
SUNAT to reduce its overall budget by a certain percentage, the same one applied 
throughout the entire public sector.
78 SUNAT must also send a copy of its budget to the 
legislature. The OIOE’s oversight role thus provides for greater accountability without 
compromising  SUNAT’s autonomy. 
Budget Management Issue: Revenue authority autonomy is strengthened by control over 
budget formulation, subject to approval either by the board of directors or an appropriate 
oversight agency. 
 
Funding mechanisms and budgetary control are essential ingredients for making 
successful ARAs. In particular, the cases show that a percentage-based funding 
mechanism needs to have a direct retention feature in order for the funding mechanism to 
be meaningful in the context of a dysfunctional PEM system. Budget allocation 
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autonomy, subject to review by boards of directors or other appropriate oversight 
agencies, is also important for making autonomy effective at the managerial level. 
 
Personnel Systems 
Unlike the controversy that surrounds the corporate governance and funding 
mechanisms, the design of autonomous personnel systems are considerably more 
straightforward. The main issue is the extent of the ARA’s autonomy to craft a personnel 
system independent of the civil service (see Table 8). In some cases, namely Kenya and 
Peru, the ARA is nearly independent of the civil service, at which point the main 
constraint to reform becomes the agency’s budget. In other cases the authority’s 
personnel system must comply with certain civil service regulations. If the goal of an 
autonomous personnel system is to allow the agency the flexibility necessary to attract 
and retain the number and quality of professionals necessary for improving performance, 
the cases suggest that a good deal of autonomy from the civil service is necessary to 
make this a reality. 
 
TABLE 8.  PERSONNEL SYSTEMS 
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LATIN AMERICA 
SAT  •  Fiscal Career 
Service 
Commission 
•  Fiscal Career 
Service 
(regulations 
issued by board 
of directors) 
•  Yes (percentage 
undetermined) 




SENIAT  •  Human Resource 
Department 














SUNAT  •  Human Resource 
Department and 
Institute for Tax 
Administration 





•  Yes (less than 
3% of total staff) 
•  Completely 
autonomous 
Source: ARA laws, acts, and decrees. 
 
In the case of the KRA, the CG is authorized to appoint all staff members, except 
the commissioners of customs and excise, income, and value added taxes, who are 
appointed by the board. The board has established a Staff Committee, composed of the 
chairperson, three other board members, the CG, and the chief human resources and legal 
officers. It is the role of the committee to approve all hiring decisions for senior 
management positions. The KRA’s Code of Conduct is the principal instrument guiding 
staff behavior and spelling out the procedures for handling disciplinary matters. 
The terms and conditions of employment are determined by the board through its 
Staff Committee, which, overall, has played a major role in the development of the KRA 
personnel system. The KRA board is empowered to determine the salary structure and 
benefits package for agency personnel (the foundation for this aspect of autonomy is the 
KRA’s exemption from the State Corporations Act).  
The nature of the KRA’s personnel autonomy, in spite of the apparent clarity of 
the KRA act, has not been crystal clear in practice: there have been cases in which the 
Public Service Commission has infringed on the KRA’s autonomy. During the 
retrenchment exercise, for example, the commission took legal action against the KRA 
over the program (though the matter was subsequently resolved). The commission also 
issued a circular in 2001 on harmonizing housing allowances in the public sector, which 
seemed to apply to the KRA, in spite of the KRA’s exemption from the State 
Corporations Act. Whether the commission will insist on the applicability of the policy to   69
the KRA, as well as the KRA’s position if the commission does insist, remains to be 
seen. 
The foundation of the URA’s personnel system is established in the (revised) 
statute. With the exception of the CG, all other management personnel, representing 
about seven percent of total staff, are appointed by the board, which also establishes the 
terms and conditions of all staff members. Contrary to the statute, URA officials report 
that in practice it is the minister of finance who actually recommends the appointment of 
the commissioners (and has informal veto power). In one case the minister allegedly also 
fired a commissioner and a deputy commissioner in 1997, in clear contravention of the 
legal procedures, which give this authority to the board.
79 
The URA’s system is based on its Human Resource Management Manual, which 
addresses issues of recruitment and selection, appointments, promotion, employment 
conditions, compensation, allowances, training, and performance reviews. The manual is 
a comprehensive set of merit-based rules and procedures. The problem is that the 
Management Disciplinary Committee does not always follow or apply the rules as set out 
in the manual. Given the intervention of the MOF in personnel matters and the weakness 
of the board (the reformed board has not established a staff committee), there is no 
system to hold management accountable to the authority’s personnel policy. Moreover, 
according to high level management, in spite of the authority’s establishment control 
system, the total number of staff and their deployment were not rationalized in practice 
due to undue extraneous influences seeping into the personnel system.
80 
The URA has also had mounting problems situating its semi-autonomous 
personnel system in the context of the government-wide civil service. Several personnel 
issues have created intra-governmental disputes.
81 The URA’s personnel system is being 
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80 Interview, 7/11/01, Kampala, Uganda. 
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eroded by court challenges and new civil service regulations. It would seem that the 
authority’s autonomy in the personnel sphere is limited at best. 
In the case of South Africa, SARS was granted a good deal of autonomy over 
personnel management and used its autonomy over the past several years to modernize its 
systems. SARS’s management determined the terms and conditions of employment after 
collective bargaining
82 with the recognized trade unions and approval by the minister. 
Staff were recruited through a meritocratic evaluation process managed by the human 
resources department with final input from the hiring manager. Higher level staff had to 
be approved by the commissioner
83 and general managers were appointed directly by the 
commissioner after undergoing an evaluation process. Many of the SARS’s general 
managers, who form the executive committee together with the commissioner, were 
appointed on fixed contracts. 
SARS personnel system had not been subject to challenge by the government’s 
civil service commission, and so did not have the problem of erosion over time like the 
other African cases. SARS, by nature of its design, however, must subject its personnel 
policy to review by the MOF, which has resulted in at least one instance of disagreement 
over pay policy. It is not clear that micromanagement of tax administrators’ salaries by 
the MOF added any value. 
SUNAT has the most control over its personnel policy as compared with the other 
ARAs. President Fujimori had granted SUNAT the authority (by issuing a separate 
decree based on a legislative enabling law) to adopt a non-public sector personnel regime.  
SUNAT has the authority to appoint and remove its employees without the need to 
consult with any other public sector entity. SUNAT also has the ability to set its own 
salary structure, the only limitation being its budget. SUNAT could not, however, set 
salaries that exceed the maximum amount set by the OIOE, though in practice this did not 
seem to be a binding constraint. 
SUNAT’s superintendent has the authority to name and remove all managerial 
level functionaries in the organization, including the adjunct superintendent. The 
positions under the direct control of the superintendent account for less than 3% of the 
                                                 
82 About 80% of SARS staff belong to one of two unions. 
83 This measure was introduced after concerns about nepotism surfaced in the organization.   71
total staff (at 2000 levels). The remaining staff are selected according to meritocratic 
procedures. SUNAT’s personnel system, which is administered by its human resources 
department, has been quite resistant to political interference.
84 In addition, SUNAT’s 
management has been very stable over time with few changes made as a result of the 
arrival of a new superintendent. 
In Mexico the SAT’s Fiscal Career Service (SFC) was voluntary for current SAT 
employees and mandatory only for new employees. Moreover, the SFC only applied to a 
certain percentage of employees; that is, there was still a category of “freely designated” 
employees, who did not have to fulfill any SFC requirements, and were named by the 
president or the board. This category included not only high level managers, but also 
specialists and technical professionals. The SFC was thus of limited applicability to the 
organization as a whole. 
The SFC is operated by a commission of SAT officials, which is composed of the 
president, a technical secretary, and the heads of all administrative departments and units. 
The SFC, created as part of the SAT law, was further developed in the SAT’s internal 
regulation, issued by the board of directors. The design of the SFC is not completely 
under the control of the SAT, however. The undersecretary for expenditure and the civil 
service unit must approve any changes in salary structures and personnel regulations. 
Thus the SAT has limited legal autonomy to design its own personnel system. 
SENIAT also initially created an agency-based personnel system: the Professional 
Human Resources System (PHRS). The PHRS, which applied to all SENIAT 
functionaries, except the superintendent and adjunct superintendent, provided for a 
meritocratic, professional system, covering recruitment, salaries, promotion, 
development, and dismissal. The system allowed SENIAT to set its own salary scales and 
provided performance bonuses. It also provided a trial period for new employees and 
prohibited those with criminal backgrounds from seeking employment in the agency. 
However, SENIAT functionaries are still considered public sector employees and with 
regard to issues not explicitly regulated by the PHRS, public administrative law applies. 
                                                 
84 There were allegations, however, that National Intelligence Service (SIN) agents infiltrated SUNAT 
during the last few years of the Fujimori administration.   72
The PHRS is operated informally by the superintendent, the human resource 
department, and the heads of the regional offices, though there is no official operating 
body. Within the regulations of the PHRS, the superintendent was authorized to name all 
normative level functionaries and the managers of the regional offices, who in turn were 
authorized to appoint the functionaries in their regions.  
The PHRS guaranteed SENIAT complete personnel policy autonomy. Though 
SENIAT took some cues from the public administration personnel system (for example, 
the PHRS is required to offer benefit packages at least as good as those in the public 
administration), is has no obligation to follow public sector regulations. The PHRS is also 
the most detailed and explicit of the agency-based civil service systems.
85 
In practice, however, the PHRS has not been consistently implemented. In spite of 
a promising start, the PHRS has not continued to guide decision making on personnel 
issues in SENIAT. Implementation of the system has depended on the disposition of the 
minister and the superintendent, who have not always utilized the system. Non-
meritocratic designation of employees seemed to be the internal norm in SENIAT during 
the late 1990s. Serious budget constraints also undermined the institutionalization of the 
PHRS. 
Personnel Issue: To safeguard autonomy the ARA personnel system should be: (a) 
exempted in the ARA founding law from government-wide civil service regulations, and 
(b) developed and regulated exclusively by the board of directors. 
 
The cases show that ARAs exempted from government-wide civil service 
regulations had greater autonomy to develop personnel systems that met their needs. In 
addition, these ARAs were better placed to resist attempts by other government actors to 
encroach on their autonomy. A comparison of the Latin American and African cases 
shows that boards of directors can play a useful role in developing the agency’s personnel 
system over time. The Venezuelan case shows that no matter how well-designed the 
personnel system may be, if its integrity is not protected, it can easily be undermined.  
 
Procurement 
                                                 
85 The PHRS statute was issued as a presidential decree.   73
Much like the personnel issue, the central question regarding ARA procurement 
autonomy is the ability of the agency to institute a flexible yet accountable procurement 
system that allows for improved performance. The country cases suggest that without the 
autonomy to design their own systems, central government procurement systems impede 
effective management and do not necessarily provide adequate safeguards. 
An important element of KRA’s autonomy has been its ability to design its own 
procurement system. The fundamental characteristic of the system, which was developed 
by the board’s finance committee (and its sub-committee on procurement), is managerial 
flexibility. Broadly, the CG is authorized to spend up to Kshs. one million. Expenditures 
between Kshs. one and six million must be approved by the board’s Finance Committee, 
while anything greater must be approved by the full board. The KRA’s procurement 
regulations, which have been widely regarded as successful in promoting flexibility and 
accountability, were later drawn on by the government when it undertook procurement 
reform. The KRA’s procurement system thus supported the government’s reform 
program, and may even have helped catalyze the wider reform effort. This example of a 
positive spillover of KRA autonomy to the wider public sector should not be overlooked 
as it demonstrates the potential of one “pocket of reform” to support other reform efforts. 
The URA has less autonomy in matters of procurement. As of 1998 the 
government established a new procurement system in which all requests greater than US$ 
50,000 must be approved by a government procurement management contractor, which 
also charges a user fee to the requesting agency. URA was made subject to this 
mechanism as well, though from 1991-1998 it had autonomy to make its own 
procurement decisions. For purchases below the threshold the management tender 
committee, composed of commissioners, has to authorize purchases. For amounts greater 
than US$ 30,000, the board must also give its approval. The encroachment on the URA’s 
procurement autonomy is another example of legal ambiguities giving way to greater 
central government control. 
SARS inherited the central government procurement system when it became 
autonomous in 1997. SARS established its own tender board and adopted a slightly 
streamlined version of the government’s regulations. Because the tender rules and 
procedures have not been redesigned, SARS still suffers from delays and inflexibilities in   74
contracting. The problem is felt most acutely in the area of IT, whose managers believe 
there is “huge room for improvement.”
86 
Neither SENIAT, nor the SAT had any differentiated procurement powers; each 
was subject to the standard procurement regulations of the public sector. SUNAT, on the 
other hand, while usually subject to standard procurement regulations, was given 
strategic reprieves from such regulations on certain occasions. For instance, in the first 
years of the reform SUNAT was authorized by presidential decree to make several 
important investments in buildings and IT systems without being bound by government-
wide procurement regulations. The decree gave SUNAT a limited timeframe in which to 
make the investments. Once the decree expired, SUNAT had to resume compliance with 
the standard procedures. SENIAT relied on periodic negotiations with the government 
comptroller to ease procurement regulations regarding large scale investments. 
Procurement Issue: Empowering  ARAs to design their own procurement systems, under 
the supervision of boards of directors and other relevant oversight agencies, makes 
autonomy more meaningful at the operational level. 
 
The consistently most limited dimension of autonomy across the four cases is 
procurement policy. At a minimum, the ARA design removed a layer of the procurement 
hierarchy. Though ARAs are still bound by the public sector procurement regulations, 
they generally do not need approval from the ministry of finance to make purchases. 
 
Accountability Mechanisms 
Formal accountability mechanisms vary significantly from case to case, perhaps 
because they are part of the system of corporate governance, around which there has been 
much debate and ambiguity. What is non-controversial is the need to balance autonomy 
with effective accountability. How exactly that is done, however, is open for discussion, 
as the cases show. Several of the cases, notably Kenya, offer potential models for other 
countries to emulate. 
One important feature characteristic of the African and the Mexican case is the 
establishment of a direct link to the legislature. This is important not only to ensure ARA 
accountability to the government, but to ensure that other government entities are also 
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accountable in relation to the ARA. Mexico’s SAT is the only ARA in Latin America that 
has a direct accountability link to the legislature. Every trimester the SAT is required to 
present a report to congress on its performance. In addition during the first six weeks of 
the year the president of the SAT is required to send a report (approved by the board) to 
congress on the programs to be implemented, the budget, and the previous year’s 
collections.  
Accountability Issue 1: To ensure fiduciary and democratic accountability, formal, 
regularized linkages between the ARA and the legislature should be established. 
 
Overall, the African cases have more advanced accountability systems than the 
Latin American cases. The Kenyan case, which is exemplary, is characterized by several 
overlapping accountability mechanisms.
87 The first is the traditional internal audit unit, 
which is charged with performing quarterly audits and presenting the results to the CG. 
The second accountability link is between the CG and the board. The CG is required to 
present the quarterly audits to the board, as well as to the CAG, who forms the third link. 
In addition the CAG is charged with auditing the annual accounts of the authority. The 
fourth layer of accountability is between the CG and the MOF. The CG must present the 
authority’s financial statements, performance indicators, and annual report both to the 
board and the MOF. The minister establishes a fifth accountability link with the National 
Assembly by furnishing it with copies of the KRA’s annual report and the CAG’s report. 
A sixth link is established by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), which has 
audited the KRA in order to make recommendations on reducing potential avenues for 
corruption.
88 Lastly, the KRA must publish its audited accounts in the public record and 
make them available to the public. 
The KRA is characterized by the most layered accountability system of the cases 
examined. The board and MOF form the first layer of oversight, which is the most active. 
The second layer is formed by the CAG and KACA, while the third is formed by the 
National Assembly and the public. In the first six years of KRA’s existence the 
accountability mechanisms have worked fairly well. Of course the quality of the 
oversight depends not on the KRA, but on the capacity of the overseers. 
                                                 
87 The Ugandan case is similar on paper, but seems to function less well in practice. 
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SARS, perhaps because it has less autonomy, has fewer accountability 
relationships with the central government. As in the other cases SARS has an internal 
audit division that reports directly to the commissioner. In SARS case the internal audit 
unit also has direct access to the chairperson of the advisory board and submits quarterly 
reports to the SARS audit committee. Unlike in Kenya and Uganda, the ARA has no 
formal reporting relationship to the board, though it does report to the MOF. Each year 
SARS must submit a performance and financial report to the minister, who in turn must 
submit it to the parliament (as well as the National Council of Provinces). The Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA) also requires that SARS submit its business plan to 
the parliament. In addition to the accountability relationship between SARS and the 
MOF, the AG must also audit SARS’s accounts on an annual basis. 
The Latin American cases are characterized by fewer formal accountability 
mechanisms. Since SENIAT is so closely under the supervision of the ministry, the MOF 
actually functions as the direct overseer. SUNAT has few formal reporting relationships 
with other government entities, though it falls within the sector of the MOF. SUNAT 
must report on its budget to the ministry, which also undertakes periodic evaluations of 
SUNAT. 
Accountability Issue 2: Taking accountability seriously means crafting a set of 
accountability linkages between the ARA and responsible oversight bodies, including the 
board of directors, the ministry of finance, the comptroller/auditor general, and 
parliament. 
 
The cases show, thus far, that accountability has not suffered as a result of 
autonomy. In fact, it is not clear that instances of malfeasance and corruption are worse in 
ARAs than they are in other public sector organizations. At the same time it is not 
apparent that ARAs are more accountable and less corrupt, either. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that in the more autonomous and more performance-oriented ARAs—Peru, 
Kenya, and South  Africa—corruption has decreased and accountability has improved, 
but it is difficult to provide hard evidence for such assertions. Some ARAs have quite 
well designed accountability mechanisms, which could easily be replicated in other 
countries. This section provides an analysis of the key accountability features that should   77
be built in to ARAs to ensure that they are responsive to their political principals, while at 
the same time ensuring that accountability does not unduly infringe on agency autonomy. 
 
Conclusion 
The cases show that the level of agency autonomy varies considerably from 
country to country. Though this section does not construct a formal ranking of autonomy,  
the relatively more autonomous revenue authorities seem to be Peru and Kenya while the 
less autonomous ones are Mexico and Venezuela. South Africa and Uganda would fall 
between these two sets on an autonomy scale. 
This section has made a number of recommendations, based on good practice, as 
well as problematic examples, from the cases, about how to design ARAs so that they 
have the level of autonomy needed to function more effectively. While detailed 
recommendations need not be repeated, three central lessons emerge from the analysis. 
First, for autonomy to be meaningful, the ARA should have some operational distance 
from the MOF. Simply put, there is no need for the MOF to micromanage ARA affairs. 
Moreover, if the MOF is highly politicized, linking the ARA too closely to the MOF 
could undermine the reform. 
Second, ARA designs are often convoluted in the way they build accountability 
into the system. Many designs mistakenly try to limit autonomy with the intention of 
increasing accountability. These designs muddle the managerial waters and, in fact, 
reduce both autonomy and accountability. Rather, separate design features should tackle 
the issues of accountability and autonomy. Accountability should be ensured through a 
series of linkages between the ARA and the executive and legislative branches, as well as 
its board of directors (think of a “checks and balances” approach ensuring 
accountability). 
Third, the board of directors model, as opposed to the superintendent model, 
promises greater benefits in terms of agency management and accountability. Boards, 
properly designed, can play an important role in advising the revenue authority on key 
issues such as personnel policy and overall business strategy. Boards can also insulate 
ARAs from political pressure and can serve as a check on their autonomy. These general   78
findings, as well as the specific recommendations in the text, should serve to improve the 
design of the next generation of ARAs. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has taken up critical questions and controversies about the design and 
performance of semi-autonomous revenue authorities in Africa and Latin America. The 
paper has analyzed the link between autonomy and performance, arguing that if one 
compares the pre- and post-reform state of affairs in these cases, the ARA demonstrates 
improvement in most cases along most dimensions of performance. The cases show that 
managers used their autonomy to implement reforms that enabled them to improve 
organizational management, and thus improve agency performance. It is important to 
note that most of these organizational reforms—critical to improving performance—
could not have been undertaken without the autonomy afforded by the ARA design. 
Moreover, the paper finds that the relatively more autonomous revenue authorities (Peru, 
Kenya, and South Africa) have been more adept at increasing performance than the less 
autonomous ones (Uganda, Mexico, and Venezuela). Thus, autonomy seems to matter, 
and more autonomy seems to matter more. 
The paper also analyzes organization design issues in detail from a practical 
perspective and provides guidelines for improving the next generation of ARA reforms. 
Three principal lessons emerge: (1) ARAs need a certain operational distance from MOFs 
for autonomy to be meaningful; (2) separate design features should be used to build 
autonomy and enhance accountability; and (3) the board of directors model affords 
greater governance benefits as compared to the CEO model.  
The cases also suggest that what has mattered most for improved performance is 
personnel reform. That is, in the Peruvian, South African, and Kenyan cases, a 
combination of retrenchment, pay reform, and a focus on personnel integrity seem to 
have had the greatest impact on performance. Though other factors were important, 
especially modes of corporate governance, personnel reform seems to have mattered in a 
foundational way. The extent to which ARAs were able to undertake personnel reform, of 
course, is a function of their level of autonomy, not only along the personnel dimension, 
but along the corporate governance and funding dimensions, as radical personnel reform   79
is both unlikely when political pressure can easily be put on the ARA and costly, 
necessitating access to resources that might not be forthcoming if the ARA does not have 
access to a modicum of financial autonomy. 
All of this is not to say, however, that autonomy is the only factor that determines 
ARA performance. It would be foolish not to recognize the importance of professional, 
capable managers in these success stories. Indeed, autonomy without a professional 
management team would produce little of value. Nor is it to say that politics does not 
matter. Clearly, political support is what allowed for the ARA reform in the first place 
and what allows for sustainable performance. It is, however, to suggest that autonomy is 
a key (necessary?) ingredient for the rapid and radical improvement of tax administration 
in developing countries. 
In conclusion, the paper has argued that the semi-autonomous revenue authority 
model, properly designed, can serve to improve tax administration in developing 
countries in a rapid and comprehensive manner. Politicians and tax administrators in 
some countries would do well to consider establishing ARAs. The question becomes: in 
which countries do ARAs make sense? The section concludes by posing a number of 
framework questions, the answer to which would guide the decision making process: 
 
o  Human Resources: Does the civil service system (including salary levels) 
allow for the recruitment and retention of specialized professionals in the tax 
agency? Is the civil service system flexible enough to provide for the 
development of specialized skills within the agency?  
o  Public expenditure and financial management (PEFM): Is the PEFM 
system sufficiently developed to allow for the execution of spending (as 
approved in the budget) in a predictable and timely fashion? Are budgeted 
resources likely to be adequate given resource scarcity? 
o  Political influence and corruption: Is the public administration robust 
enough to deal effectively with undue political influence and corruption in the 
tax agency? 
o  Procurement: Are procurement practices adequate for ensuring accountability 
and flexibility at the agency level?   80
 
To the extent that the answers to these questions are in the negative, the case for 
an ARA becomes more compelling, because it is in these contexts that ARAs hold the 
most promise of making tax administration more effective, efficient, and fair.
89 
 
                                                 
89 The political logic of ARA reform is analyzed in Taliercio (2000).   81
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